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A bstract
In differentiated markets, product-line decisions are a key dimension of the 
competitive process. In this thesis, I study firms’ product-line choices in dy­
namic vertically-differentiated markets, capturing the process of "creative de­
struction" whereby technological progress allows firms to introduce products 
of better quality in the market tha t affect the profitability and ultimately the 
viability of relatively obsolete products of lower quality.
The starting point of my analysis is the development of a static empiri­
cal structural model of endogenous quality choice, which I use to study the 
determinants of optimal product lines in the market for personal computers. 
I empirically estimate the structure of this model and I use it to study the 
relationship between consumers’ willingness to pay for quality and the equilib­
rium range of qualities sold in the market. I then take a closer look at firms’ 
product-line choices by developing an empirical structural dynamic model of 
optimal product-line decisions in the presence of sunk adjustment costs. This 
model allows me to capture the relative rigidity of product lines tha t I ob­
serve in the market for personal computers, to estimate firms’ product-line 
adjustment costs and to study the impact tha t these costs have on firms’ 
profitability.
I also illustrate two theoretical studies tha t provide additional insights on 
firms’ optimal product-line decisions in innovative markets. The first study
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investigates the intra-firm cannibalisation considerations tha t underlie the 
process of product replacement. I then analyse the product-line decisions 
taken by durable-good manufacturers and, in particular, I present a model 
to  explain why durable good manufacturers in dynamic industries often play 
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In differentiated markets, product-line choices are a key dimension of the com­
petitive process. In this thesis, I present four empirical and theoretical studies 
of optimal product-line decisions.
In Chapter 1, I develop and estimate a static structural model of endoge­
nous quality choice, which I use to study the determinants of optimal product 
lines in the market for personal computers. This is a prototypical example 
of a dynamic vertically-differentiated market in which the range of qualities 
sold rapidly evolves over time as ongoing innovation allows firms to introduce 
products of better quality in their product lines and obsolete products of lower 
quality are withdrawn from the market in a relatively ordered sequence.
In this model, I explain the equilibrium range of product-qualities sold in 
the market as the result of optimal product-line decisions adopted by a set of 
monopolistically competitive firms given exogenous, though evolving, techno­
logical conditions. I recover empirically the structure of demand and supply 
of this entry model and I simulate the impacts tha t a change in consumers’ 
willingness to pay for quality and a change in the cost of providing product 
variety have on the range of product-qualities sold in the market and on firms’ 
profitability.
In Chapter 2 ,1 also follow a structural empirical approach to the study of 
quality choice. In particular, I extend the static model presented in Chapter
12
1 to  a dynamic specification, accounting for the sunk costs tha t firms incur 
when modifying their product fines. The existence of (fixed) sunk costs implies 
th a t product-line decisions have a dynamic nature and th a t firms adjust their 
product fines discontinuously, only when the benefits of doing so exceed the 
costs. This feature of the model matches well the relative rigidity of product- 
lines tha t I observe in the market for personal computers.
I estimate the structure of this dynamic model by using the approach 
developed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2006) and, in particular, I derive 
estimates of the costs th a t firms incur when modifying their product fines. To 
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study th a t empirically estimates 
product-line adjustment costs.
I use the calibrated model to simulate the impact of a reduction of product- 
line adjustment costs on firms’ profitability.
From the perspective of an individual firm, the existence of fixed sunk 
adjustment costs has both a direct and an indirect negative impact on a firm’s 
profitability. The direct impact is the outlay tha t the firm incurs every time 
it modifies the product fine. The indirect effect on profitability stems instead 
from the impact tha t adjustment costs have on the product fine optimally 
sold by the firm. When changes to  product fines entail a significant fixed sunk 
cost, the firm will not optimally modify the products it sells every period to 
adapt to changing technological and market conditions, but only when the 
(expected) benefits of doing so exceed the costs. This product-line rigidity 
implies that, in general, the set of products sold by the firm each period is sub- 
optimal in the sense th a t it does not maximise period profits (even though it is 
optimal in a dynamic perspective). In addition, in equilibrium, the existence 
of adjustment costs affects also the evolution of rival firms’ product fines and 
of aggregate market variables and, a priori, the impact on firms’ profitability
13
is unclear. The results tha t I have obtained suggest however tha t the existence 
of adjustment costs does indeed decrease firms’ profits.
The structural empirical models tha t I present in the first two Chapters 
of this thesis explain the range of qualities sold in the vertically-differentiated 
market for personal computers as the result of competition among a set of 
monopolistically competitive firms in a technologically dynamic environment. 
In these models, the range of qualities sold in the market is determined by 
competitive forces rather than by cannibalisation considerations.
However, cannibalisation may also be an im portant factor underlying firms’ 
product line decisions in the presence of technological progress. In some cases, 
a firm may optimally add a new product to its product line, without withdraw­
ing any lower-quality product (’’product proliferation”) thereby improving its 
ability to discriminate between consumers with different willingness to pay for 
quality. In some other cases, however, when a firm introduces a new product 
in its product line, it may decide to withdraw products of lower quality to 
avoid cannibalisation (’’creative destruction”).
In Chapter 3 I complement the analysis of the first two Chapters by pre­
senting a vertical-differentiation model to  study creative destruction as arising 
from optimal product line design by a monopolist. In particular, I consider a 
model in which firms can sell any of a given set of feasible qualities under gen­
eral specifications of utility and technology. I characterise the impact th a t the 
introduction of a new quality in the product line has on other product-qualities 
and determine a necessary and sufficient condition for creative destruction (as 
opposed to product proliferation) to be optimal.
Inthis model, when creative destruction takes place because of price dis­
crimination considerations it has a localised nature, i.e. the introduction of 
a product may drive products of neighbouring qualities out of the market.
14
This may well explain creative destruction in the form of product upgrad­
ing tha t occurs in those industries in which new products take the place of 
older similar versions (e.g. software, cars). However, it does not explain the 
process of creative destruction observed in the market for personal computers 
where movements of the frontier of technology are associated with the exit of 
’’distant” products at the bottom  of the quality ladder.
Creative destruction is a fundamental determinant of product lines in dy­
namic vertically-differentiated markets. The first three Chapters of this thesis 
study the economic mechanisms th a t determine if and to what extent prod­
ucts of lower quality survive the introduction of better products in the market. 
In a number of industries for durable goods, however, despite discontinuing 
the production of older-generation products, manufacturers often continue to 
(re) sell relatively obsolete products by acting as intermediaries in their ex­
change in the second-hand market. For instance, since 1987 IBM has been 
reselling used IT equipment, such as mainframes, midrange systems and PC 
servers. O ther manufacturers in IT  industries, such as Compaq, Dell, Hewlett 
Packard, Cisco and SUN offer trade-in promotions and resell used equipment, 
which they usually refurbish and often adapt to the specific needs of customers. 
In the market for aircraft, Boeing has been selling even used Airbuses. Most 
car manufacturers sell certified pre-owned vehicles to which they extend war­
ranty coverage and now account for one third of used cars tha t are exchanged 
in the US.
In order to study the incentives of a durable-good manufacturer to trade 
used goods, in Chapter 4, I consider a market for a durable good subject 
to quality-improving technological change. Secondary trading has two main 
effects on the market for the new technology. Used goods are a substitute for 
new goods and hence tend to decrease the price at which the new technology
15
can be sold. At the same time, however, second-hand trade makes it possible 
for former patrons to upgrade to the new technology (or in general to  upgrade 
more frequently). I suggest tha t, in some industries, by intervening as an 
intermediary in the market for used goods and internalising the transaction 
costs of second-hand trade, the seller may ease the process th a t allows former 
patrons to  upgrade to the new technology while selling the new technology to 
new consumers at the highest price possible and be better off than  by leaving 
secondary trading to be managed by specialised intermediaries.
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C hapter 1
Entry in differentiated  
markets: a structural m odel 
of optim al product lines
1.1 Introduction
Since Hotelling’s (1929) seminal contribution, a large body of research has 
investigated product differentiation as the outcome of firms’ optimal economic 
decisions. 1 However, despite the well-established theoretical literature, empir­
ical structural studies of product differentiation have been few. In strategic 
settings, the potential multiplicity of equilibria and computational difficulties 
have been the main obstacles to  the introduction of differentiated entry loca­
tions in empirical models of market structure. Some progress, however, has 
recently been made in the study of firms’ entry decisions in differentiated mar­
1The theoretical literature on product differentiation is vast. Seminal contributions to 
this literature include Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983 and 1987); Spence (1976a, 1976b) and 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1997).
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kets as the equilibrium outcome of a discrete game played by a set of potential 
entrants (Mazzeo 2002, Seim 2005, Davis 2005).
In this Chapter, I develop and estimate a static structural model of en­
dogenous quality choice, which I use to study the determinants of optimal 
product lines in the market for personal computers.
Like the existing empirical literature on entry, I develop a structural model 
that explains market structure as the outcome of firms’ optimal (product) 
entry decisions, and I use the configuration of products th a t I observe in the 
market to draw inference on parameters of the profit function, and in particular 
to estimate structural parameters of firms’ cost function.
However, the original modelling approach tha t I follow takes advantage of 
some features of the market for personal computers to  simplify the analysis 
of firms’ product-line decisions, and distinguishes this study from the existing 
empirical literature on endogenous market structure. F irst of all, since I deal 
with a rather fragmented market, I consider a model of endogenous quality 
choice under monopolistic competition rather than a strategic entry game. In 
addition, given the nature of product differentiation in the market for personal 
computers, and the availability of detailed data on product quality, I am able 
to treat firms’ location decisions as a continuous variable rather than a discrete 
choice. Finally, I focus on the product location decisions taken by a number 
of established rivals, i.e. I do not model the number of firms active in the 
industry as endogenous.2
I use this structural model to  study the range of product-qualities sold 
in the market for personal computers over a number of years, capturing the 
process, common to many innovative industries, th a t can be described as a
2 However, the model could be easily extended to endogenise the number of active firms 
in the market.
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”moving quality window” : as technological progress allows firms to introduce 
products of better quality in the market, relatively obsolete products at the 
bottom  of the quality ladder are withdrawn in a relatively ordered sequence.3 
The width of the quality window depends on the extent to  which products 
of lower quality can profitably survive the introduction of better products of 
higher quality in the market, which in turn  depends on the structural charac­
teristics of demand and supply, such as consumers’ preference for quality and 
production costs.
By developing and estimating a structural model, I can study how the range 
of product-qualities sold in the market is affected by changes to the charac­
teristics of the market environment even in the absence of relevant natural 
experiments. In particular, I simulate the impact of a change in consumers’ 
marginal utility of quality on the equilibrium range of product-qualities sup­
plied in the market and I estimate the impact on firms’ profits.
The development of software is an im portant determinant of the decline 
in the value of computers (Geske, Ramey and Shapiro 2004). A change in 
consumers’ marginal utility of quality can be thought of as capturing the de­
velopment of new software applications th a t increase the utility tha t consumers 
can derive from the quality, e.g. from the speed, of a PC. In this model, the 
impact of an increase in consumers’ marginal utility of quality is to increase 
the sales of PCs of relatively high quality and to reduce the sales of PCs of 
relatively low quality. As a result, the equilibrium range of qualities supplied 
in the market is reduced because some low-quality products are drive out of 
the market and, in a dynamic perspective, the life cycle of a personal computer 
of any given quality is shortened.
I also study the impact tha t a reduction in the cost of providing product
3The term ”moving quality window” was originally used by Sutton (2001).
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variety in the form of a wide(r) range of qualities has on firms’ profitability. 
In particular, I show th a t this change increases firms’ profits, but tha t this 
increase is significantly reduced by firms’ endogenous reaction, i.e. the increase 
in the equilibrium range of qualities sold in the market.
This Chapter is organised as follows. I first review the related literature. 
In section 1.3 I describe the industry. In section 1.4 I describe the model 
and its equilibrium and in section 1.5 I discuss the empirical specification and 
estimation of the model. Finally, in section 1.6 I present the results of the 
model simulations and final conclusions follow.
1.2 Related literature
Some recent contributions to  the empirical literature on entry have extended 
the equilibrium models estimated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) and 
Berry (1992) to markets with non-homogeneous products.
Mazzeo (2002) considers a discrete entry model with complete information, 
which he uses to study entry decisions with endogenous quality choice in the 
oligopolistic motel markets along U.S. interstate highways. He shows tha t the 
negative effect tha t a competitor has on a firm’s payoffs is up to  twice as large 
if tha t competitor sells the same product type and provides empirical support 
to the product choice theories tha t predict firms will offer products unlike 
those of their competitors. However, a drawback to this model is th a t com­
puting an equilibrium configuration is difficult for markets with large numbers 
of locations and firms: Mazzeo’s analysis shows tha t even with only three qual­
ity levels, estimation becomes burdensome due to  the large number of profit 
constraints th a t must hold in an equilibrium configuration.
Seim (2005) studies entry in differentiated markets with an incomplete- 
information model in which firms’ have private shocks to their profitability
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th a t are not observed by competitors. This modelling approach allows her to 
derive the resulting Bayesian Nash equilibrium conjectures more easily than in 
Mazzeo’s complete information framework and, as a result, it can potentially 
deal with a larger number of quality locations. She applies her model to the 
location decision of new firms in the video retail industry and obtains results 
th a t show evidence of strong incentives for spatial differentiation.
Davis (2005) focuses instead on the problem of the potential multiplicity 
of equilibria in strategic games of entry and provides both a generalisation 
and an extension of the theoretical results developed by Bresnahan and Reiss 
(1991) and Berry (1992). He considers a class of games in which firms’ profit 
functions depend on their own strategy and their rivals’ strategy only through 
an index of market output and derives sufficient conditions under which this 
index of market output is uniquely determined within the set of pure strategy 
market equilibria. This result can inform an empirical estimation strategy of 
this class of models even in the presence of multiple equilibria.
Like these studies of entry in differentiated markets, I also consider a model 
in which firms make endogenous product entry choices and I use observed mar­
ket structure to draw inference on parameters of the profit function. However, 
there are two main differences between the approach tha t I follow and the ex­
isting literature: since I deal with a relatively fragmented market, I consider a 
model of monopolistic competition rather than  a strategic game; and I trea t a 
firm’s location decision as a continuous variable rather than as a discrete vari­
able. As a result, I am able to deal with (product) entry in a rather complex 
differentiated market with a large number of quality locations.
Since I focus on the product-quality decisions taken by a set of established 
rivals, this study can also be looked at as a structural analysis of optimal 
product-line decisions. The empirical literature on the determinants of optimal
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product-lines spans the boundaries between economics and marketing but is 
also rather limited, with the vast majority of existing research following a 
reduced-form approach.
Stavins (1995) investigates entry and exit decisions a t the model level in 
the market for personal computers in the period between 1976 and 1988. In 
the marketing literature, Bayus and Putsis (1999) also provide a reduced-form 
analysis of additions to, and deletions from, product lines in the market for per­
sonal computers. More recently, Draganska and Jain (2005) introduce choices 
of product range (number of flavours) into a structural model of competition 
in the horizontally-differentiated market for yoghurt.
I contribute to this literature by developing an original structural model 
of quality choice tha t explains optimal product lines as the result of firms’ 
optimal decisions. Empirical models of quality choice have also been developed 
by Crawford and Shum (2005), who study the welfare impact of endogenous 
quality choice in the market for cable television in the U.S using a modelling 
approach derived from the theoretical screening literature used in the analysis 
of optimal non-linear pricing, and by Carranza (2006), who develops a dynamic 
model of endogenous quality choice in the market for digital cameras which is 
somehow similar to the dynamic model tha t I will present in Chapter 2.
The market for personal computers has been the subject of various studies. 
In many the analysis has been focused on the estimation of the demand for 
personal computers. Genakos (2004) estimates a random coefficient discrete 
choice model of the demand for personal computers. Bajari, Benkard and 
Lanier (2005) estimate a hedonic model to estimate the demand for personal 
computers. Foncel and Ivaldi (2005) estimate a differentiated-products model 
of the home PC market. Stavins (1997) also employs hedonic coefficients to 
estimate price elasticities for differentiated products in the market for personal
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computers. Bresnahan, Scott and Trajtenberg (1997) evaluate the sources of 
temporary market power in personal computers in the late 1980s and find 
segmentation both between frontier and nonfrontier products and between 
branded and nonbranded products.
Recently, Deltas and Zacharias (2006) have also studied the pricing behav­
iour of PC manufacturers. Their results suggest tha t entry prices of firms are 
set to extract short run rents from consumers who have a higher willingness 
to pay for their brand. Stengos and Zacharias (2006) also study the intertem ­
poral pricing of personal computers and find tha t high-quality firms charge 
higher premia only for their most advances products.
1.3 The personal com puter industry
The personal computer industry is a prototypical example of an industry char­
acterised by prominent vertical differentiation in which the range of the quality 
of the products sold in the market evolves over time as the result of a seemingly 
relentless process of ’’creative destruction” induced by ongoing technological 
progress.
In this paper, I use a dataset th a t comprises quarterly data  on quanti­
ties, prices and characteristics of desktop personal computers sold by the top 
nine producers in the U.S. market in the home segment between 1995Q1 and 
2001Q2. The data is from the personal computer tracker (PC Tracker), an in­
dustry census conducted by International D ata Corporation (IDC ) . 4 IDC data 
on personal computers have been used in a number of studies on the PC  indus­
try, e.g. Foncel and Ivaldi (2005), Pakes (2003) and Bayus and Putsis (1999). 
The IDC dataset provides disaggregation by manufacturer, brand name, and
4 The dataset was kindly made available to me by Christos Genakos and a detailed de­
scription of the constructed variables can be found in Genakos (2004).
23
processor froup (chip type and processor speed bandwidth). The processor 
groups are described in Table 1 .1 . Each observation in the IDC dataset (de­
fined as a combination of vendor, brand and processor group5) was matched 
with more detailed product characteristics from various PC  magazines. Be­
cause of the need to match the original dataset with additional information, 
the available data covers only the main 9 producers: Acer, Compaq, Dell, 
Gateway, IBM, Sony, Toshiba, Hewlett-Packard and NEC .6 These firms ac­
count for about 60% of to tal desktop PC sales in the home-segment (see also 
Foncel and Ivaldi, 2005).
Table 1.3 provides a summary of prices, sales and quality of desktop per­
sonal computers over the 26 quarters covered by the dataset.
Prices of desktop personal computers have decreased by about 50% in 
real term  in around 5 years. The price reduction is remarkable, especially in 
relation to the significant increase in the quality of personal computers over 
time. Figure 1-3 shows the evolution of prices by processor group and Table
1.5 shows the evolution of average prices by vendor.
Aggregate sales have followed an upward trend but also show a clear sea­
sonal pattern as illustrated in Table 1.3. Figure 1-2 shows the evolution of 
aggregate sales by processor group, providing an overall picture of technologi­
cal life cycles over the period considered. In the period covered by my dataset, 
im portant CPUs were introduced in the market (e.g. Pentium, Pentium II, 
Pentium III). Some of these also disappeared from the market before 2001Q2, 
e.g. Pentium, Pentium MMX, Pentium II. Therefore, the period covered by 
my dataset is sufficiently long to allow me to observe the entire life-cycle of
5 Notice, therefore, that in general an observation in my dataset is the aggregation of 
different individual products.
61 do not have data for Sony and Toshiba for all periods. These firms, however, account 
only for 3% of the sales of the 9 manufactuers.
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some im portant CPUs.
The market shares at the vendor level (calculated on the basis of their 
combined total sales) are reported in Table 1.4. Since these vendors account 
for about 60% of total desktop PC sales in the home segment, these figures 
actually overestimate the true market shares of the vendors.
The average market share of an observation in my sample (calculated rel­
ative to total sales) is equal to only around 1.5%. Moreover, 95% of the ob­
servations in my sample have a market share of less tha t 6 .6 %. These figures 
suggest tha t the average market share of a product in this market is very low 
since the statistics tha t I have reported overestimate the average market share 
of a product for two reasons: (i) each observation is actually the aggregation 
of a number of products and (ii) the vendors in my sample account only for 
about 60% of total desktop sales.
The quality of a personal computer derives from the combination of a 
number of characteristics such as the processor, the hard-disk, the RAM, etc. 
In Table 1.3,1 capture quality by the speed of the PC processor (in MHz) which 
is a key determinant any personal com puter’s performance and is strongly 
correlated with other characteristics such as the amount of RAM and the size 
of the hard disk as shown by Table 1.2.7
The average speed of personal computers sold in the market has increased 
by about ten times between 1995 and 2001. This increase derives from both 
the introduction of computers of faster quality and the exit of computers at 
the bottom of the quality ladder from the market. As mentioned above, in the 
period covered by the dataset, new im portant generations of CPUs such as 
Intel Pentium, Intel Pentium II and Intel Pentium III were introduced in the
7 The CPU industry has been the subject of a number of recent studies including Song 
(2007) and Gordon (2006).
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market while older CPUs such as Intel 486, Intel Pentium and Intel Pentium 
II completed their life-cycles.
This process is summarised graphically in Figure 1-4, which shows the 
evolution of the range of qualities of PCs sold in the market in the period 
between 1995Q1 and 2001Q2. In the graph, quality is measured by the natural 
logarithm of the processor benchmark. The benchmark of a processor is a 
more encompassing measure of the processor’s quality than speed because it 
accounts for differences in the processor architectures th a t affect performance 
beyond the simple measure of clock speed.
The graph shows tha t the evolution of the range of qualities sold in the 
market over time follows a process of "creative destruction" th a t can be de­
scribed as a "moving quality window” : as technological progress shifts the 
frontier of technology forward, obsolete products are progressively withdrawn 
from the market. The "moving quality widow" pattern seems common to 
many other innovative industries but not to all: for instance, de Figueiredo 
and Kyle (2006) show tha t the introduction of faster laser printers has not 
been associated with the exit of slower laser printers from the market.
Figure 1.9 shows in which of the exogenous processor groups defined in 
Table 1.1 each firm is active .8 This analysis shows an im portant characteristic 
of the product lines sold by firms in this market: firms tend to sell product 
lines with no holes.9 It is therefore reasonable to describe a firm’s product 
line by the range of qualities it sells, rather than by the detailed specification
8Notice, thereofore, that the quality variable in this graph is discrete by construction.
9Notice that most instances of "holes" are related to the Pentium Pro, which has always 
been a very marginal technology as can be seen from its limited sales in Figure 1-2. Towards 
the end of the sample, the holes in the product line are essentially related to the AMD Athlon 
processor which was just introduced in the market. These holes appear to be related more to 
the availability of AMD processors, which were not adopted by several manufacturers who 
chose to use Intel products, rather than to choices concerning the range of qualities sold by 
vendors.
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of the quality of each product sold. Another feature of firms’ product lines, 
which I will discuss in more detail in the next Chapter, is th a t firms do not 
appear to  seek differentiation from the rivals in the quality space as there is 
no evidence of persistent inter-firm product differentiation over time.
1.4 The m odel
Demand is specified as a standard discrete-choice logit model. There are M  
consumers in the market. The utility th a t consumer i obtains from purchasing 
product jf, j  = 1 , 2 ,..., n, is specified as
uij = aqj +  t pj +  £ij = Sj +  £ij (1.1)
where qj and pj are respectively the quality and the price of product j , and 
£ij is an i.i.d. extreme-value distributed error term. It is reasonable to  expect 
tha t a > 0 and tha t 7  <  0. Since individuals’ heterogeneity enters the model 
only through the non-deterministic part of utility, utility can be decomposed 
into the mean-utility term Sj =  aqj -f- 7 pj and the. stochastic idiosyncratic 
component eij.
Each consumer purchases one of the products sold in the market to  max­
imise her utility. The market share of product j  is given by the standard logit 
expression:
S,  =  ^ L  ( i 2 )
^ 2  exp (Si)
i= 1
There are n f  firms active in the market. The set of product-qualities that 
firms can introduce in their product lines is determined by exogenous tech­
nological conditions: there are N j equally-spaced feasible qualities, spanning
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the range between 0 and the frontier of technology Q. Let A q = 1 /N j  be the 
w idth of each quality location. Each firm /  sells a product line with no holes 
Qf th a t includes all feasible qualities between the "marginal quality" 
and the top quality qj.
A product of quality q can be produced at constant marginal cost
c(q) =  4>q
In addition, I assume tha t each firm incurs the fixed cost of production F, 
which does not depend on a firm’s output but which depends on the range of 
product-qualities supplied:
F  = f { q j -  gf )
The profits of product-quality qj sold by firm /  are thus
Wf (qj) = M exp (aqj +  1V! ^  k !  ^  ~  ^  (1.3)
nf 9/
where S  =  ^  exp (aq +  7 p / (q)) is the "aggregate index of market out-
/= i 9=2,
put", which fully summarises the impact tha t market structure has on the 
market share, and hence on the profitability, of any product-quality.
Each firm sequentially chooses (i) its product line { q ^ q ^ j  and (ii) the 
price of each product included in its product line. I analyse the equilibrium 
of this model under the following set of assumptions.
A ssu m p tio n  1 . 1  A product’s profitability is increasing in quality: (a  +  j f i )  >
0
A ssu m p tio n  1.2 The introduction and the pricing o f any product has a
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negligible impact on the aggregate index o f market output.
A ssu m p tio n  1.3 There is a continuum of feasible quality locations: A q —►
0 .
Assumption 1.1 imposes a restriction on the param eter space th a t ensures 
tha t a product’s profits are monotonically increasing in quality and therefore 
that, in equilibrium, optimal product lines include only products of relatively 
high quality. This assumption can be verified empirically given estimates of 
a , 7  and 4>.
Assumption 1.2 entails the consideration of a monopolistically competitive 
market in which each firm’s decisions have a negligible impact on aggregate 
market variables. This assumption implies tha t (i) firms do not interact strate­
gically in the market when taking product-line and pricing decisions and (ii) 
cannibalisation considerations do not play a role in firms’ pricing and product- 
line decisions. This is because in this model all cannibalisation effects are 
captured by the impact tha t (the price of) a product has on the aggregate 
index of market output .10 The assumption of monopolistic competition is po­
tentially restrictive but it is consistent with the substantial fragmentation at 
the product level in the market for personal computers and with assumption 
1.3.
Assumption 1.3 states tha t there is a continuum of feasible qualities. This 
assumption is im portant because it allows me to treat quality as a continuous 
variable when I analyse firms’ product-line choices.11 Notice that, since firms 
sell all feasible qualities in an interval, this assumption also implies th a t each 
firm is selling a continuum of product-qualities. In the limiting case in which 
each firms sells a continuum of qualities, firm / ’s profit function can be w ritten
10 In Chapter 3, I consider a vertically-differentiated model to focus on the analysis of can­
nibalisation considerations and product-line decisions in the presence of product innovation.
11 Mazzeo (2002) considers instead only three available quality locations.
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as
irf  = ^ - J  exp (aq +  7 p (q)) {p (q) -  <f>q) dq -  F  (qf  -  qf )  (1.4)
where
n/ y
S = Y1 exp(ag +  7p(g))dg
/= 1/
is the aggregate index of market output in the case in which each firm /  sells 
a continuum of qualities between q^ and qj. The derivation of expression 1.4 
can be found in Appendix 1.10.1.
The equilibrium of this model is a set of prices and of product lines such 
th a t (i) each firm maximises profits taking the aggregate index of market 
output as given and (ii) the aggregate index of market output is consistent with 
firms’ optimal choices. The following proposition characterises equilibrium 
prices and product lines.
P ro p o s itio n  1.1 (i) In equilibrium, a product o f quality qj is sold at price 
equal to
P(<ljY = Hj - -
(ii) Each firm  sells all qualities in the range [g*, Q] where q*solves
(1.5)
I f  )
1 +  In " /  /  exp (atq — 1 +  ~/<pq) dq
_ V i '  J
a +  70
(1.6)
P ro o f. See Appendix 1.10.2. ■
Notice that, given the assumption of monopolistic competition, optimal 
pricing entails a fixed markup above the marginal cost of production. The op­
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timal markup does not depend upon the number of products or, more gener­
ally, on the set of product-qualities sold in the market and it does not converge 
to  zero as the number of products in the market increases. 12
Since I have not considered firm-specific product attributes or differences in 
marginal costs across firms, the equilibrium marginal quality q* does not vary 
across firms. The model could be easily extended to deal with heterogeneous 
firms by introducing a "brand" characteristic or firm-specific marginal costs of 
quality. However, I have not found tha t in the market for personal computers 
there is any persistent difference across firms in the product lines supplied and 
I have therefore chosen to focus on the simplest specification of the model with 
no firm heterogeneity .13
Finally, since a product’s profits are increasing in quality, a firm will sell 
all feasible qualities above the marginal one, up to the exogenous frontier of 
technology Q.
1.5 Empirical specification and estim ation
Estimation of the structure of model entails recovering the parameters of the 
utility function a  and 7 , the marginal cost of quality (f) and the fixed cost F ■ I 
adopt a multi-step estimation strategy. First of all, I recover the parameters of 
the utility function by estimating a standard logit demand system. Then, by 
using the first-order-condition underpinning optimal pricing decisions, I esti­
mate the marginal cost of quality. Finally, I infer the fixed cost F  by matching 
observed and predicted optimal product lines, and in particular observed and 
predicted marginal product-qualities q.
12 This is consistent with Bajari and Benkard (2003) who observe that in a logit model 
with a large number of products Bertrand-Nash markups do not converge to zero.
13I discuss inter-firm heterogeneity further in Chapter 2
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This sequential estimation approach is commonly used and it has both 
advantages and disadvantages compared to the simultaneous estimation of all 
the parameters of the model.
Since it does not enforce the equilibrium conditions th a t derive from the 
supply-side of the model in the estimation of demand, consistency of the esti­
mates of the demand parameters does not depend on supply-side equilibrium 
assumptions and is therefore robust to a wide set of possible assumptions.
However, conditional on the model reflecting the true data-generating 
process, greater efficiency could be obtained by imposing the supply-side equi­
librium conditions in the estimation of demand parameters. In addition, using 
the full structure of the model could also address some potential endogeneity 
problems in the estimation of demand. For instance, estimating demand on 
the basis of a selected panel sample in which attrition is driven by endogenous 
product-line choices without accounting for the endogenous selection results 
in inconsistent and biased estimates. Using an explicit model of product entry 
and product exit to explain this endogenous attrition could potentially over­
come this problem. This is potentially an im portant benefit of developing a 
model of endogenous product choice and I plan to explore this issue in future 
research.
1 .5 .1  E s tim a tio n  o f  d em a n d
In the model, demand is specified as a standard discrete-choice logit model. 
The estimation equation th a t I use estimate the parameters a  and 7  is based 
on expression 1.2 and is derived (in Appendix 1.10.3 as the difference between 
the logarithm of the market share of a given product (In (sh jt)) and the average
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of the logarithms of all products’ market shares ( In {sh)t
In (shjt) -  In (sh)t = a  (q5 -  q) + 7  (Pj ~  p) +  tjt  (1.7)
where market share is defined as sales of product j  over to tal observed sales 
and 6jt is an i.i.d. error term . 14
I define the quality of good qjt as the natural logarithm of the processor 
benchmark of the product. 15 Processor speed is the most im portant character­
istic of a personal computer and it is strongly correlated with other character­
istics, such as the amount of RAM and the size of the hard disk. Benchmarks 
are essentially numbers assigned to each processor-speed combination based 
on technical and performance characteristics. They are very strongly corre­
lated with the speed of the processor but capture also other characteristics of 
a processor tha t affect performance and are therefore a more encompassing 
measure of quality . 16
To the extent tha t there are unobserved factors affecting demand which are 
not observed by the econometrician but which are observed by firms in advance 
of setting prices, prices will be endogenous and estimation methods based 
on ordinary least squares (OLS) will not generate unbiased and consistent 
estimates.
For instance, endogeneity may arise because there are demand shocks un­
observed by the econometrician but observed by the firm. I follow the ap­
proach th a t was originally proposed by Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994)
14 Notice that the estimates obtained from this equation do not differ from those obtained 
by the more common estimating equation for the logit demand model defined on the basis 
of the difference between the market share of a product and the market share of the outside 
option and including a full set of time dummies.
15 CPU benchmarks were obtained from The CPU Scorecard (www.cpuscorecard.com).
16 CPU benchmarks have been widely used as a measure of quality. See for instance Bajari 
and Benkard (2004) and Genakos (2005).
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and Hausman (1996) which relies on using the prices of goods in other markets 
as instrum ents for the price of goods in a given market. Specifically, I use the 
Canadian price of a product as an instrument for its US price.
The underlying identifying assumption is tha t demand shocks are not cor­
related across markets while cost shocks are. If this is true, prices in another 
market therefore should be correlated with the price in the given market but 
should not be correlated to demand. This class of instrum ents has been used 
commonly used in the recent 1 0  literature on the estimation of demand for 
differentiated products, not only in product-level models of demand but also 
in discrete-choice characteristics-based models of demand, e.g. Nevo (2000).
This instrument, however, is not suitable to correct for the potential en­
dogeneity th a t arises if prices are correlated with unobserved product char­
acteristics, since these unobserved characteristics are likely to be the same in 
different markets. This could potentially be a problem given tha t I do not 
control for many product attributes. However, the measure of quality tha t I 
use is strongly correlated with other im portant product characteristics th a t I 
do not include as regressors in the estimating equation, such as the size of the 
hard-disk and RAM. I also consider two alternative specifications of the model 
in which I control for as many product characteristics as possible to assess if, 
despite this strong correlation, unobserved product characteristics still affect 
the estimate of 7  obtained from equation 1.7.
Other instrum ents have also been in the literature to address the endo­
geneity of prices. In particular, instruments can also be derived by considering 
variables th a t are correlated with the price-cost margin (rather than the cost). 
For instance, if product characteristics and product fines are considered exoge­
nous, instruments could be constructed on the basis of the characteristics of 
other products sold in the market and of the ownership structure of products
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(see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995). I do not attem pt to use the qualities 
of other products as an instrument because in this model I do not consider 
product qualities to be exogenous.
The estimation results are presented in Table 1.6 where the IV specification 
tha t I use is reported in the second column. The Table reports also OLS 
estimates. The IV price coefficient estim ate is consistent with the results 
obtained in other studies on the dem and for personal computers th a t have 
used a similar demand model (see for instance the logit estimates in Genakos 
(2004)). The result of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity: suggests 
tha t it is possible to reject the hypothesis tha t OLS estimates are consistent 
at the 1% level and therefore provides support to the use of instruments.
In order to assess if unobserved product characteristics are the source of 
further endogeneity problems, I have also run the estimation with product 
fixed-effects, which are meant to control for all unobserved product character­
istics tha t are time invariant, and w ithout product fixed-effects bu t controlling 
for all product characteristics th a t I observe in my dataset .17 The estimates 
of 7  obtained in these two models, which are also reported in Table 1.6, are 
not materially different to the IV estim ate derived in the simpler regression in 
which I use one product characteristic only to control for quality.
The analytical simplicity of the logit specification of demand clearly comes 
at the price of substantial and possibly undesirable structure being imposed 
on consumers’ substitution patterns. It is well known tha t the logit model 
assumes tha t the distribution of a consumer’s preferences over products other 
than the product bought do not depend on the characteristics of the preferred 
product and therefore tha t own price derivatives depend only on market shares.
17The additional product characteristics include: RAM, hard disk size, presence of a CD- 
ROM, speed of modem, monitor, monitor size, presence of a ethernet card, dvd reader and 
soundcard.
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Despite its limitations, however, the logit demand specification is still com­
monly used in empirical structural models because of its analytical tract ability. 
In particular, the analysis of optimal product lines in this Chapter and Chap­
ter 2  is greatly simplified by the property of the logit demand function whereby 
a product’s demand depends on the other products sold in the market only 
through an aggregate index of market output, a property th a t neither the 
random-coefficient logit (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)) nor the pure- 
characteristic model of demand (Berry and Pakes (2005)) share.
1 .5 .2  E s t im a tio n  o f  th e  m arg in a l c o s t  o f  q u a lity
I have specified a marginal cost function with constant returns to quality
ct (<7i) — (ptQi
Since firms buy PC components in an open market, the cost of producing a 
given product-quality may also be changing exogenously over time and I allow 
the marginal cost of quality to be time-dependent.
The estimating equation is derived from the first-order-condition for op­
timal pricing, i.e. from expression 1.5. More specifically, given the (IV) es­
tim ated marginal utility of income 7  =  2.414 and observed prices, I run the 
following hedonic-type regression:
V (Qi) + i  = (f>tqi + uit 
7
where uu  is an error term assumed to be independent and identically distrib­
uted across qualities and time and drawn from a standard Normal distribution. 
The regression has no intercept and time-dependent slopes th a t capture the 
variation of the marginal cost of quality over time. Table 1.7 shows the results
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of the estimation.
The identification of the marginal costs of production is based on the op­
timal price-cost margins predicted by the theoretical model, and therefore de­
pends on the assumption tha t consumers’ marginal utility of income is constant 
and on the assumption tha t firms are monopolistically competitive, which im­
plies an optimal constant markup over the marginal cost of production.
1 .5 .3  E s t im a tio n  o f  th e  f ix e d  c o st
The last parameter tha t I need to estimate is the fixed cost of product variety 
F , which I identify on the basis of the marginal qualities q sold by firms. 
Proposition 1.1 states tha t the marginal quality sold by firms is
I use expression 1.8 to construct a simple non-linear OLS regression to 
estimate the parameter F  as follows.
Given estimates of a , 7  and of (f> and firms’ observed product lines, I 
construct an estimate of the index of market activity S* as
I set "market size" M  equal to the number of to tal sales each period. Esti­
mation results are reported in Table 1.8. 18 Given th a t the average length of 
firms’ product lines in the sample is 0 .8 8 , the estimated average fixed cost of 
production is therefore estimated to  be about $44 millions per quarter. This
(1.8)
18 Notice, however, that the standard error is not corrected for the sample bias that affects 
the parameters 0 , 7  and <j>.
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fixed cost is about 41% of average gross period profits predicted by the model.
1.6 Simulation o f equilibrium product lines
Given the estimates of the parameters of the model tha t I have recovered 
empirically, I can simulate the equilibrium range of qualities sold in the market. 
In particular, by considering exogenous changes to the technology, i.e. different 
values of Q and of </>, and to market size, I can simulate the evolution of the 
equilibrium range of qualities over time so as to reproduce the moving quality 
window tha t I observe in the market in the period between 1995 and 2001.
In order to determine the equilibrium range of qualities supplied in the 
market, I solve numerically the following expression for q* for each period, i.e. 
for each vector of exogenous variables/parameters [Q, M, </>]:
1  V
1 +  In -IE .M rif I exp (aq  — 1 +  7 <f>q) dq 1
v, r  / _ (1.9)a +  70
In the simulations, I  set M  equal to observed total sales in each period, 
and I consider the frontier of technology to  be equal to the average top quality 
sold by firms in the market.
The actual and predicted marginal qualities are shown in Figure 1-5, to­
gether with the estimated exogenous frontier of technology. It can be seen 
tha t, despite its simplicity, the model tracks reasonably well the evolution of 
the range of qualities sold in the market, even though the simulated marginal 
quality shows a seasonal behaviour, which is due to the seasonality in the total 
sales tha t I observe in the market.
One of the main advantages of estimating a structural model is the ability 
to simulate counterfactual scenarios to study economic phenomena in the ab­
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sence of relevant natural experiments. In particular, I use the model to  study 
the impact of a change in consumers’ willingness to pay for quality. A change 
in consumers’ marginal utility of quality can be thought of as capturing the 
development of new software applications tha t increase the utility th a t con­
sumers can derive from the quality, e.g. from the speed, of a PC. As I show 
in Appendix 1.10.4, in this model, the impact of an increase in consumers’ 
marginal utility of quality is to increase sales of personal computers of rela­
tively high quality and to reduce sales of personal computers of relatively low 
quality.
The simulated impact of a an increase in a  from the estimated value of 
2.06 to the value of 2.5 on the range of qualities sold in the market is shown in 
Figure 1-6.19 Figure 1-6 shows tha t, as expected, the increase in consumers’ 
willingness to pay for quality increases the level of the marginal quality in 
the market, i.e. reduces the width of the quality window. I have estimated 
that the impact of the increase in consumers’ willingness to pay on a firm’s 
profits is on average $9.8 millions per quarter, relative to an estimated average 
quarterly net status-quo profits of about $61 millions.
I have also simulated the impact of a change in F , i.e. the cost of providing 
product variety in the form of a wider range of qualities. A change in F  has 
both a direct and an indirect effect on a firm’s profitability. First of all, for 
any given range of qualities sold, a change in F  has a clear impact on the 
fixed cost borne by a firm. However, a change in F  also affects the product 
line sold by a firm and by its rivals in equilibrium, which could partially offset 
the direct impact on profitability. The simulated impact of a 50% decrease in
19Notice, however, that this counterfactual analysis is undertaken for a given level of total 
sales. Since in this model no consumer purchases the outside option in equilibrium when 
there is a continuum of products in the market, the counterfactual analysis does not capture 
the impact that a change in the willingness to pay for quality has on total sales.
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F  is shown in Figure 1-7. As expected, it can be seen th a t the equilibrium 
width of the "quality window" increases as it is now less expensive to sell any 
given range of qualities in the market. If the change in F  did not affect firms 
product lines, a firm’s profits would increase by $2 2 .6  millions per quarter on 
average. However, taking into account the indirect effect, i.e. the endogenous 
changes to  firms’ product lines, the increase in profits due to the reduction in 
F  considered is 39% lower, being only $13.8 millions per quarter.
Ideally, I would also like to use the model to  study and to measure the im­
pact of changes in the economic environment on consumer welfare, accounting 
for the endogenous determination of the equilibrium range of qualities sold in 
the market. However, the logit model belongs, together with the random co­
efficient logit discussed in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and the random 
coefficient probit (Hausman and Wise 1978, McFadden 1981), to a class of 
discrete-choice models with an error additive component with full support on 
the real line tha t are not adequate to quantify welfare in markets with a large 
number of products. This is because in these model the error term captures 
idiosyncratic tastes for products tha t are independent of product character­
istics. Since the idiosyncratic shock has unbounded support, when there is 
a continuum of product-qualities available for purchase, the maximum utility 
tha t a consumer can expect to obtain in the market is infinite.
This limitation of the model could be overcome by the use of an alternative 
demand model th a t is better suited to deal with markets in which there is a 
large number of products. One potential alternative to the logit is the pure- 
characteristic demand model developed by Berry and Pakes (2001) and by 
Bajari and Benkard (2005). However, using a demand system of this kind 
would substantially complicate the derivation of optimal product lines because 
of the localised nature of consumers’ substitution patterns captured by these
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demand systems, which does not make possible to use a simple aggregate index 
of market output to summarise market structure. Another possible alternative 
could be the use of a quality-adjusted representative-consumer demand model 
a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), which is often used in theoretical models of 
monopolistic competition with a continuum of products but which has not 
been widely used in empirical applications in industrial organization.
1.7 Conclusions
In this Chapter, I have presented an empirical structural model of endoge­
nous product choice in a differentiated market. By considering a model of 
monopolistic competition with a continuum of feasible qualities rather than a 
strategic discrete entry game, I have been able to develop a manageable struc­
tural model of quality choice tha t captures the main economic determinants 
of optimal product lines in the complex and dynamic market for personal 
computers.
Despite its relative simplicity, the model reproduces relatively well the 
evolution of the aggregate range of qualities over time observed in the market 
for personal computers in the form of a moving ’’quality window” , capturing 
the process of creative destruction whereby technological progress th a t allows 
firms to introduce new better products in the market also forces the exit of 
low-quality products.
I have recovered the structure of the model empirically. As in other studies 
of endogenous market structure, I have used the observed configuration of 
products sold in the market to draw inference on parameters of the profit 
function, and in particular on firms’ production costs.
The model tracks reasonably well the evolution of the range of product- 
qualities sold in the market for personal computers. I have also simulated
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the impact of an increase in consumers’ willingness to  pay for quality and of 
a reduction in the cost of providing product variety on equilibrium product 
lines and firms’ profitability. The impact of a change of consumers’ willing­
ness to pay for quality is to increase sales of relatively high-quality products 
and to reduce the sales of relatively low-quality products. As a result, when 
consumers value quality more, the range of products th a t can survive in the 
market is reduced, which also implies tha t product life-cycles are shortened. 
The impact of a reduction in the cost of providing product variety is to in­
crease profits, but firms’ endogenous modifications to  their optimal product 
lines reduces the profit increase by 39% relative to the case in which product 
lines did not change.
The model can be developed and improved in a number of ways. For 
instance, the model does not endogenously explain technological progress, i.e. 
the shifts of the frontier of technology over time. Considering technological 
progress as exogenous is not an unreasonable assumption since in the market 
for personal computers much of the improvements to  product quality stem 
from innovation tha t takes place in the upstream components markets. By 
endogenising technological progress, however, the model could potentially to 
be applied to  a larger variety of markets in which innovation is an im portant 
feature of competition and to explain endogenous product variety in a more 
encompassing way. However, the only meaningful way to  capture endogenous 
technological progress is in the context of a dynamic model.
Another reason why it would be useful to  consider a dynamic model of 
optimal product lines is tha t introducing products to and withdrawing prod­
ucts from a firm’s product line is normally not costless. In the next Chapter, 
I discuss how the consideration of product-line adjustment costs can improve 
the understanding of the range of qualities optimally sold by firms in the mar-
42
ket for personal computers and I develop a dynamic model of optimal product 






















Table 1.1: Processors and CPUs
Processor group CPU
486 Intel 486DX2, AMD 486DX2
5th generation <100MHz Pentium
5th generation 101-149 MHz Pentium, Pentium MMX, Cyrix Media GX
5th generation 150-179 MHz Pentium, Pentium MMX, AMD K6
5th generation > 180 MHz Pentium, Pentium MMX, Cyrix Media GX
6 th  generation <  200 MHz Pentium Pro
6 th  generation 201-299 MHz Pentium II, AMD K6
6 th  generation 300-399 MHz Pentium II, Celeron, AMD K6
6 th  generation 400-499 MHz Pentium III, Pentium II, Celeron, AMD K6
6 th  generation 500-599 MHz Pentium III, Celeron, AMD K6-2
6 th  generation 600-699 MHz Pentium III
6 th  generation 700-799 MHz Pentium III, Celeron
6 th  generation 800-899 MHz Pentium III, Celeron, AMD K6
6 th  generation 800-899 MHz Pentium III
6 th  generation >  1 GHz Pentium III
7th generazion 600-699 MHz Athlon
7th generazion 700-799 MHz Athlon
7th generation 800-899 MHz Athlon
7th generazion 1-1.5 GHz Athlon, Pentium IV




hard 0 .8 8 0.79 1
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Table 1.3: Quality, prices and sales in the market for Personal Computers
Period Lowest speed Average speed Top speed Lowest price Average price Top price Total sales
1 50 85 133 1256 2333 4093 995179
2 50 89 133 1168 2205 3256 807281
3 50 93 133 1080 2161 3239 1219146
4 50 1 0 1 180 1359 2177 3897 1536614
5 50 123 2 0 0 1063 2227 4930 1219411
6 6 6 128 2 0 0 1250 2302 3903 960013
7 6 6 141 2 0 0 1338 2297 3632 1417532
8 90 155 2 0 0 1039 2083 3515 1723069
9 1 2 0 172 233 1046 2093 3773 1463808
1 0 1 2 0 191 266 984 2071 3562 1241581
1 1 1 2 0 196 266 884 1906 3198 1694879
1 2 166 229 350 929 1973 3346 2052952
13 150 270 450 831 1996 3138 1672734
14 166 292 450 944 1836 2807 1358593
15 180 306 450 854 1683 2515 1810164
16 180 323 450 765 1517 2497 2346936
17 233 395 550 867 1527 2347 2147084
18 266 418 550 764 1417 2223 1843719
19 300 428 550 672 1263 2239 2300758
2 0 300 489 650 623 1291 2270 2988577
2 1 400 616 1 1 0 0 707 1422 2563 2904770
2 2 400 650 1 1 0 0 658 1373 2237 2118870
23 400 665 1 1 0 0 602 1312 2329 2694950
24 400 690 1 1 0 0 521 1242 2267 2855113
25 400 727 1 1 0 0 499 1177 2172 2025285
26 500 862 1500 534 1171 1949 1499484
Table 1.4: Vendors’ market shares
Acer Compaq Dell Gateway Hewlett-Packard IBM NEC Sony Toshiba
1995Q1 4% 1 2 % 2 % 16% 0 % 1 2 % 53%
1995Q2 6 % 15% 2 % 14% 1 % 13% 48%
1995Q3 6 % 1 2 % 2 % 1 1 % 6 % 13% 50%
1995Q4 1 1 % 13% 2 % 1 1 % 6 % 1 1 % 46%
1996Q1 7% 17% 3% 1 2 % 7% 7% 46%
1996Q2 8 % 15% 3% 15% 5% 1 2 % 43%
1996Q3 5% 23% 3% 1 0 % 6 % 9% 36% 4% 5%
1996Q4 5% 25% 4% 1 1 % 5% 1 1 % 33% 2 % 4%
1997Q1 6 % 2 0 % 3% 15% 6 % 6 % 35% 3% 5%
1997Q2 5% 16% 4% 14% 8 % 8 % 39% 4% 3%
1997Q3 4% 30% 3% 15% 9% 6 % 29% 3% 2 %
1997Q4 6 % 25% 4% 19% 8 % 1 0 % 25% 3% 1 %
1998Q1 6 % 2 2 % 5% 19% 15% 8 % 2 2 % 3%
1998Q2 2 % 19% 7% 17% 16% 8 % 28% 3%
1998Q3 2 % 2 0 % 6 % 2 0 % 18% 1 1 % 2 2 % 1 % 0 %
1998Q4 3% 2 2 % 5% 24% 17% 1 0 % 17% 1 % 0 %
1999Q1 1 % 23% 6 % 24% 23% 8 % 14% 1 % 0 %
1999Q2 1% 26% 9% 2 1 % 19% 9% 14% 1 % 0 %
1999Q3 1 % 27% 9% 23% 23% 7% 1 0 % 1 % 0 %
1999Q4 0 % 30% 1 1 % 23% 27% 3% 4% 0 % 1 %
2000Q1 1 % 32% 8 % 24% 31% 1 % 3% 0 % 0 %
2 0 0 0 Q2 1 % 26% 1 1 % 25% 33% 2 % 1% 1 % 0 %
2000Q3 1% 32% 9% 24% 32% 1 % 0 % 1 % 0 %
2000Q4 1 % 28% 1 1 % 23% 35% 1 % 0 % 1 % 0 %
2001Q1 1 % 24% 14% 27% 32% 0 % 0 % 1 % 0 %
2001Q2 1 % 2 1 % 2 0 % 2 2 % 32% 1 % 0 % 3% 0 %
Mean 4% 22% 6 % 18% 16% 7% 24% 2% 1%
Table 1,5: Average prices by vendor
Acer Compaq Dell Gateway Hewlett-Packard IBM NEC Sony Toshiba
1995Q1 2,710 2,234 2,398 2,524 3,224 2,064 1,894
1995Q2 2,693 2,094 2,398 2,313 2,725 1,899 1,826
1995Q3 2,504 1,985 2,417 2,216 2,566 1,974 1,774
1995Q4 2 ,0 1 2 2,283 2,350 2,443 2,459 2,043 1,829
1996Q1 2,029 2,044 3,117 2,174 2,266 2,348 2,037
1996Q2 1,762 1,979 2,562 2,709 2,292 2,236 2,071
1996Q3 1,626 1,997 2,663 2,545 2,270 2,487 2,044 2,678 2,918
1996Q4 1,769 2,096 2,370 2,413 2,015 2,161 1,788 2,280 1,538
1997Q1 1,931 2 ,0 0 2 2,054 2,350 2,051 1,936 2,172 1,803 1,691
1997Q2 1,976 2,068 2,108 2,271 1,926 1,925 2,184 1,617 1,504
1997Q3 1,647 1 ,8 6 8 1,893 2,092 1,788 1,655 1,961 1,947 1,691
1997Q4 1,760 1,925 2,032 2,124 1,958 1,841 2,018 1,932 1,527
1998Q1 1,846 1,917 2,123 2,099 1,813 2,095 2 ,0 2 1 1,979
1998Q2 1,721 1,672 1,899 1,905 1,642 2,044 1,941 1,959
1998Q3 1,540 1,514 1,780 1,823 1,466 1,832 1,740 1,755 1,740
1998Q4 1,341 1,450 1,732 1,714 1,289 1,723 1,519 1,365 1,722
1999Q1 1,478 1,394 1,699 1,714 1,392 1,660 1,297 1,607 1,630
1999Q2 1,209 1,272 1,548 1,631 1,337 1,317 1,319 1,439 1,494
1999Q3 1,095 1,171 1,390 1,347 1,164 1,133 1,335 1,291 1,341
1999Q4 889 1,252 1,365 1,375 1,181 1,093 1,363 1,399 1,365
2000Q1 1,242 1,251 1,361 1,467 1,272 1,364 1,588 1,687 1,436
2000Q2 973 1,187 1,408 1,364 1,123 1,306 1,538 1,722 1,335
2000Q3 903 1,187 1,357 1,354 1,034 1,233 1,374 1,557 1,504
2000Q4 861 1,147 1,267 1,293 968 1,129 1,255 1,483 1,426
2001Q1 812 1,052 1,319 1,198 931 1,094 1,288 1,420 1,342
2001Q2 819 1,075 1,299 1,229 1,062 960 1,143 1,358 1,227
Mean 1,583 1,658 1,920 1,911 1,739 1,714 1,705 1,714 1,580
Table 1.6: Estimation of demand
Variable OLS Estimates IV Estimates IV Fixed-effect Estimates IV Estimates with all characteristics











































R* 0 .1 1 0.16 0 .1 0.29
N 1,703 1,703 1,703 1,703
standard errors in brackets 
* : significant at the 1 0% level 
** : significant at the 5% level 
*** : significant at the 1% level
Table 1.7: Estimation of marginal costs
Param eter Estimate Standard error Confidence interval
0 i 384.5 13.5 358.0 411.0
0 2 354.2 12.3 330.1 378.4
03 341.8 1 2 .1 318.1 365.4
04 340.9 11.5 318.3 363.4
05 337.4 12.5 312.8 361.9
0 6 344.1 1 2 .2 320.2 368.1
07 335.3 11.4 312.9 357.8
0 8 293.8 10.3 273.5 314.1
09 284.2 1 0 .1 264.4 304.0
0 1 0 275.3 8.5 258.6 292.0
0 1 1 246.3 8.3 230.0 262.6
0 1 2 248.6 7.8 233.2 264.0
013 246.7 7.6 231.7 261.7
014 217.8 7.9 202.3 233.4
015 192.7 8 .1 176.7 208.7
016 164.9 8.5 148.2 181.5
017 160.4 8.7 143.4 177.5
018 143.0 9.1 125.2 160.8
019 120.5 9.2 102.4 138.6
0 2 0 121.4 8.7 104.3 138.5
0 2 1 134.7 6.4 1 2 2 .2 147.2
0 2 2 126.9 6 .6 114.0 139.9
023 118.6 6 .6 105.6 131.5
024 108.9 6 .2 96.7 1 2 1 .0
025 99.4 6 .8 8 6 .2 112.7
026 96.3 6 .1 84.4 108.3
R2 =0.94
N =l,703
Table 1.8: Estimation of fixed cost
Param eter Estimate Standard error Confidence interval



























































Figure 1-1: Analysis firms’ product lines
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Figure 1-6: Simulation of the impact of higher willingness to pay for quality
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1.10 A ppendix to  Chapter 1
1 .1 0 .1  D e r iv a t io n  o f  th e  p rofit fu n c tio n  an d  o f  m a rk et sh a res  
w ith  a  co n tin u u m  o f  fe a s ib le  p r o d u c t-q u a lit ie s
Consider the (gross) profit function of firm /  for a given (finite) Nj:
i f
IexP (aq + iPf (q)) {pf (q) -  <t>q)\
9=2,
ITf = M  1nj qf
^ 2  exP (<*q +  7Pf (q)) +  exp {So) f=1 q=gf
Multiply both  the numerator and the denominator of this expression by 
A q =  1 / N j  and consider the hmit for A q —> 0  :
i f
[exp {aq +  7 p f  (q)) (pf  (q) -  (j>q)] A q
q=l f7Tj — lim M
A q —>0 n f  Qf
exP (a q +  i P f  (q)) A q +  exP 0*o) &q
f = 1 q=qf
This expression can be written as 
i f
J  exp (aq + y p ,  (q)) (Pf (q) -  H) d(l 
w, =  - ---------------------------------  (1.10)
n f y
Y 2  /  exp(aq  + i p f  (q))dq
f = \
Following the same approach, it is possible to derive the market share for
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a (sub)set of qualities [a,b] C (JpQf sold by firm /  as
b
J  exp (aq +  7 P/ (q))dq
a_________________________
2 J  I exp (aq + j p f  (q)) dq
1 .1 0 .2  P r o o f  o f  p r o p o s it io n  1.1
P ro o f, (i) Each firm sets the price of each product sold. Differentiate ex­
pression 1.4 with respect to p(q j ), the price of quality qj E <7^9/] an(l, 
according to assumption 1.2, assume that -y =  0. The first-order-condition 
for optimality is
M e x p ( o ^ M  (1 +  7  ^  _  H ) ]  dq = Q
where
T l f  Q f
S  = [  exP (a Q — 1 +  l ^ q )  dq (1-12)
f=l
; i f
This implies tha t the optimal price is
(ii) Notice that, given optimal pricing behaviour, firm / ’s profit function is 
9/
7rf  = ^ - J  exp ( a q -  1 +  7  <j>q) dq — F (qf  -  qf )  (1.13)
i f
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Equilibrium product lines must satisfy two conditions: each firm must sell 
a product line that maximises its profits given the aggregate index of market 
output S , and the aggregate index of market output must be consistent with 
the choices made by all firms. Assuming tha t =  0, the first-order-condition 
tha t pins down the optimal marginal quality q^ is
=  M  exp (a g f  -  1 +  ^  +  F  =  0
which implies that
1 +  In ( - H j f . )
£f  (S’ ) = £* (S*) = ----------------> (1.14)
The second-order condition for a maximum is th a t
d2/Ki
=  M  exp (a g f  — 1 +  74>gjj — ia  +  7 4>) < 0Qq2 r  \  - f  ' 'r- /  >/ 'y
which is verified under assumption 1 .1 : (o; +  7 </>) >  0  because 7  <  0 .
• -Consider now the derivative of the profit function with respect to the high­
est quality sold
= - M  exp (aqf  -  1 +  7 (f>qf ) i  -  F
This expression is zero for qj = q* and, if (a  +  7 4>) > 0, it is negative for any 
q < q* and positive for any q > q*. Therefore there is a corner solution for a 
maximum: q*j = Q.
In equilibrium, it must be the case th a t the index of market output S* is
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consistent with firms’ decisions, i.e. tha t
Q
S* =  rif J  exp (aq — 1 +  7 <f>q) dq (1-15)
1*
which follows from the definition of S *. Expression 1.6 derives from the com­
bination of 1.14 and 1.15. ■
1 .1 0 .3  D er iv a tio n  o f  th e  e s t im a tin g  e q u a tio n  o f  d em a n d
The market share of product j  (defined as the sales of product j  divided by 
total sales) is given by the standard expression:
The average of the natural logarithm of all products’ market shares is:
exp (aqj +  7 pj)
The natural logarithm of product j ’s market share is equal to:
n
wheren is the number of products, q = ^  qi is the average quality of the
i= 1
T l j
products in the market and P = ^ ~  Pi is their average price.
i—l
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Consider now the expression j^ ln (shj) — In (sh)j :
In (shj) -  In (sh) = (aqj +  7 pj) -  (aq +  7 p) =
=  a t e - 9 ) + 7 ( P j - p )
Given market shares calculated on the basis of to tal sales and quality and
price information this expression can be used to estimate the param eters a
and 7 .
1 .1 0 .4  T h e  im p a ct o f  a  ch an ge in  th e  m a rg in a l u t il i ty  o f  q u a lity  
o n  p ro fits
In this section I consider the impact of a change in the marginal utility of 
quality on a product’s profits. Profit of product-quality qj given by expression
1.3
^  / X M exp (agj +  7 pf  (qj)) (pf  (qj) -  <f>qj)
' "  nf  qf
X I exp (a q + w f  (q))
f = l  q=qf
Substitute the optimal price p f  (qj) =  (f>qj +  ^ derived in proposition 1.1
exp (aqj -  1 +  7 <f>qj)
7
to obtain
7v (q) = M
nf  qf
X I X I  exp -  1 +  7 H )
f= 1 q=qf




nf qf nf qf
XIXIexp ( a q  ~  1+ “ EE q exp (aq — 1 +  7 (f>q)
f = 1 q=qf  f = 1 q=qf
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where A =  Mexp(ajj 1+7^ 3)  ^ q ^^er assumption 1.1 whereby
(a+70) EE exp(aq-l+y<f>q)
(a +  7(p) > 0.
Therefore, -7r^ <7---- > 0 if and only if
nf 9/
Y 2  X qexp  (aq  _  1 +
/=19=9/
9j > ------^ -----------------------J nf 9/
X Xexp ( a q  ~1+7<^o
/=1 9=9/
The threshold is meaningful since, as long as min < max {? /} .
T l f  9 /
X 122 q e x v  (aq ~ 1+ 7^)
min { 2 /} <  <  max {? ,}
X  X I exp (a 9 “  1 +  709)
/=1 q=qf
since
n /  9/  n /  9/
X  X  2exp (a9 -  1 + 709) X  X  max f e }  exp (aq~ 1 + 709)
/ =1 <*=2/  /=19=2/ f_ r ------------------------------ < -------------- =------------------------------------- =  max \ q f 1n/ qf nf qf
X  X  exp (Q9 “ 1 + 709) X  X  exp (Q9 “ 1 + 709)
/=1  9= 9/  /=1  9= 9/
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19
*b=b i=/  h=b i=;
(b<pL +  X — bn)  dxa ^  ^  (b(f)L +  X — bn) dxa ^  r~^
I'/—') fb fu fb fuy b  \ uira = -----------------------------------------;---------- <
fb=b i—/  fb=b i=;
(b(pL +  X — bn) dxa uira (b<pL +  \  — bn) dxaZ> r~^
fb fu fb fu
pile
C hapter 2
A  dynam ic m odel o f optim al 
product lines in th e presence 
of adjustm ent costs
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 ,1 developed a model of endogenous product lines to explain the 
range of product-qualities sold in the market for personal computers as the 
outcome of firms’ optimal decisions, and I studied the relationship between 
consumers’ willingness to pay for quality and equilibrium product variety. 
The analysis relied on a static model which posited that firms could cost­
lessly modify their product lines and therefore that they could immediately 
adapt the range of product-qualities sold to evolving technological and market 
conditions.
In general, however, adding new products to and withdrawing products 
from a firm’s product line is not costless. For instance, introducing new prod­
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ucts often entails significant R&D outlays and additional sunk costs to bring 
the developed product to the market. Similarly, withdrawing products from a 
firm’s product line may also entail sunk "adjustment" costs, e.g. to rearrange 
the purchase of inputs, the production line, distribution arrangements and to 
update promotional material. Yet, despite the vast body of research on pric­
ing and investment decisions in the presence of adjustment costs, and despite 
the  importance of firms’ product-line choices, I am not aware of any empirical 
study of the costs tha t firms must bear to modify their product lines.
In this Chapter, I develop a structural model of product-line decisions in 
the presence of sunk product-line adjustment costs which I apply to  the market 
for personal computers. I use the model to derive an empirical estimate of the 
adjustment costs of adding products to and withdrawing products from a 
firm’s product line and to  study the impact th a t adjustment costs have on 
firms’ profitability.
Prom the perspective of an individual firm, the existence of (fixed) sunk 
adjustment costs has both a direct and an indirect impact on profitability. 
The direct impact is the outlay tha t the firm incurs every time it modifies 
its product line. The indirect effect on profitability derives instead from the 
impact tha t adjustment costs have on the product line optimally sold by the 
firm and on the product lines sold by its competitors. When changes to the 
product line entail a significant fixed sunk cost, the firm does not optimally 
modify the products it sells every period to  adapt its portfolio to changing 
technological and market conditions, but only when the (expected) benefits of 
doing so exceed the adjustment cost. This product-line rigidity implies that, 
in general, the set of products sold by the firm each period is sub-optimal in 
the sense that it does not maximise period profits (even though it is optimal in 
a dynamic perspective). In equilibrium, however, it is not clear, a priori, what
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the impact of adjustment costs on a firm’s profitability is, because adjustment 
costs affect not only a firm’s product line but also the product lines (optimally) 
sold by rival firms.
The model th a t I present in this Chapter is very similar to  the one th a t I 
discussed in Chapter 1, and it retains much of its structure. The main differ­
ence is that, while in the static model of Chapter 1 1 assumed th a t product-line 
adjustments were costless, I now consider the case in which changes to a firm’s 
product-line entail a fixed sunk cost.
Prom a modelling perspective, when firms incur a cost to  modify their prod­
uct lines, product-line decisions become dynamic since firms need to consider 
when it is optimal to modify their product portfolios. Dynamic considerations 
enrich the analysis of product-fine decisions but are also the source of consid­
erable analytical complexity, which has to be dealt with when characterising 
the solution of the model and when estimating its structure.
First of all, because of the complexity of the economic environment th a t 
I consider, optimal product-line decisions cannot be described analytically as 
in the model th a t I presented in Chapter 1. In fine with the literature on dy­
namic games of industry evolution, I therefore rely on numerical methods to 
characterise the equilibrium of the model. In order to reduce the dimension­
ality problem th a t stems from dealing with endogenous market structure in a 
differentiated market with many competitors, I rely on a model in which the 
impact of market structure on any firm’s profits is completely summarised by 
an aggregate index of market output. Each firm considers only this aggregate 
index of market output when choosing its actions rather than the detailed de­
scription of the entire set of products sold by each firm. This approach, which 
is similar in spirit to the one th a t Melnikov (2000) proposed to  estimate (logit) 
dynamic models of demand for durable goods, reduces the dimensionality of
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the state space substantially and is the source of significant computational 
savings.
In addition, inference of some of the structural parameters of the model is 
based on restrictions that derive from the model’s dynamic equilibrium. An 
obvious nested estimation algorithm would require solving for the equilibrium 
of the model for each possible param eter value, which would be computation­
ally demanding. Instead, I estimate these parameters following the two-step 
estimation approach developed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007). The 
idea behind this estimator is tha t, if it is possible to  recover an estimate of 
the policy functions from the data, the relevant param eters can be estimated 
through a simulation procedure as those tha t make the observed policy func­
tions optimal. This approach greatly simplifies the empirical estimation of 
complex dynamic models by avoiding the need to compute the equilibrium of 
the model even once.
After estimating the structure of the model, I study the impact tha t adjust­
ment costs have on profitability by simulating the evolution of firms’ product 
lines over a period of 6  years (to match the period covered by my dataset) both 
in the presence of estimated adjustment costs and in the hypothetical coun- 
terfactual scenario in which there are no adjustment costs. The comparison 
of the present value of firms’ simulated profits in the two scenarios suggests 
tha t, in equilibrium, the existence of adjustment costs decreases firms’ profits.
This Chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of 
the literature to which this study is related. Section 2.3 describes some of the 
features of product-line adjustments in the market for personal computers tha t 
motivate the analysis. Section 2.4 presents the model. Section 2.5 describes 
the estimation strategy and results. The simulation of the model and the 
counterfactual analysis is discussed in section 2 .6  and final conclusions follow.
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2.2 R elated  literature
The economic literature on adjustment costs is large and it spans a variety 
of research fields. For instance, adjustment costs have been studied in the 
context of investment decisions (Abel and Eberly (1994), Caballero and En­
gel (1999)), labour demand (Caballero and Engel (1993)), pricing decisions 
(Caplin and Spulber (1987)) and the purchase of durable-goods (Lam (1991), 
Eberly (1994), Attanasio (2000)). However, to  the best of my knowledge, this 
is the first empirical study th a t considers product-line adjustment costs.
From a modelling perspective, this study is related to  the literature on 
structural dynamic models of industry evolution. Ericson and Pakes (1995) 
and Pakes and McGuire (1994) laid the foundations for the study of dynamic 
oligopolistic games of industry evolution. The development of these seminal 
contributions into a rich body of literature, however, has been limited by the 
significant computational difficulties tha t arise even when dealing with simple 
economic environments.
Gowrisankaran and Town (1997) study a dynamic game in the hospital in­
dustry, which they estimate with a computationally intensive nested GMM al­
gorithm and use to  analyse the impact of government policies. Benkard (2004) 
develops a multi-agent dynamic model of the commercial aircraft industry and 
studies industry pricing, industry performance, and optimal industry policy in 
presence of learning-by-doing. Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) study capacity 
dynamics. Dunne et al. (2006) apply the dynamic model of entry and exit 
developed by Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2004) to the study of entry and 
exit of dentists and chiropractors in geographic markets. Ryan (2007) stud­
ies the welfare costs of environmental regulation on the US Portland cement 
industry. He recovers the entire cost structure of the industry, including the 
distribution of sunk entry costs and adjustment costs of investment using the
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same two-step estimator th a t I employ in this study.
Unlike most of these papers, I do not consider an oligopolistic dynamic 
game but a dynamic model of endogenous product-quality choice in a mo- 
nopolistically competitive market. In addition, I address the problem of the 
dimensionality of the state space by relying on a model in which the impact 
of market structure of a firm’s profits can be entirely summarised by a simple 
scalar, the "aggregate index of market output". Firms do not need to  con­
sider the detailed description of all products sold in the market but only the 
(expected evolution of the) aggregate index of market output when choosing 
optimal product lines. Melnikov (2000) used a similar approach to  develop and 
estimate a dynamic demand model where consumers’ optimal intertemporal 
choices can be fully described on the basis of the evolution of an index tha t 
summarises all the products in the market.
Recently, a number of contributions have significantly developed the tools 
for the econometric estimation of dynamic games, building upon the founda­
tions set by the literature on the estimation of single-agent problems (Hotz 
and Miller (1993), Hotz et al. (1993), Rust (1994)). In this paper, I will dis­
cuss and I will use the estimating approach proposed by Bajari, Benkard and 
Levin (2007). Other approaches to the estimation of dynamic games have been 
recently proposed by Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007), by Aguirregabiria 
(2007) and by Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2004).
The paper th a t is closest to this study is the one by Carranza (2006) who 
also considers a dynamic model of endogenous quality choice in a monopo- 
listically competitive market, with an application to  the market for digital 
cameras. Like Carranza (2006) I also develop a model of endogenous quality 
formation but I introduce product-fine adjustment costs and consider endoge­
nous product exit. Moreover, I use a radically different estimation approach
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to recover the structural parameters of the model, which does not require the 
solution of the dynamic equilibrium and is therefore significantly less compu­
tationally intensive.
By considering endogenous product variety in a dynamic perspective, this 
paper is also related to the empirical literature on product survival which 
has been developed by Stavins (1995), Greenstein and Wade (1998), Genakos 
(2005) and de Figueiredo and Kyle (2006). All these studies are based on 
reduced-form product entry and exit models. By contrast, in this study I 
am able to explicitly relate product survival to the fundamental structure of 
demand and supply and therefore I can potentially study how product exit is 
affected by changes to the economic environment.
2.3 Product-line adjustm ents in th e  market for per­
sonal com puters
As I discussed in Chapter 1, the market for personal computers is a dynamic 
environment characterised by an ongoing process of creative destruction. Tech­
nological progress allows firms to  introduce personal computers of better and 
better quality in the market. In turn, product innovation affects the viability 
of personal computers of lower quality, which are eventually withdrawn from 
the market in a relatively ordered sequence generating a pattern th a t can be 
described as a "moving quality window".
In Chapter 1, I studied the evolution of the aggregate range of qualities 
sold in the market assuming tha t firms could modify their product portfolios 
without incurring in any sunk cost and therefore th a t they could immediately 
adapt their product lines to  changing technological and market conditions. 
However, the relative smooth evolution of the aggregate quality window tha t I
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considered in Chapter 1 conceals the pattern of product-line adjustments tha t 
takes place at the firm-level.
Figure 2-1 shows the evolution of the product lines of the 9 manufacturers 
over the period 1995Q1-2001Q3. In the graph, quality is proxied by the natural 
logarithm of the benchmark of the P C ’s processor. As I discussed in Chapter 
1 , the performance of the CPU is arguably the most im portant determinant 
of a P C ’s quality and it is strongly correlated with other characteristics such 
as the RAM and the size of the hard-disk and therefore it is a good proxy for 
a P C ’s overall quality. The Figure shows tha t PC manufacturers tend to sell 
broadly similar ranges of qualities but tha t there are differences, especially at 
the bottom of the product lines. This variance is described more precisely in 
Table 2.1 and in Table 2.2, where I report some descriptive statistics of the 
highest and lowest qualities sold by firms.
Figure 2-2 disentangles the evolution of the product lines of the largest 
manufacturers and shows more clearly the nature of each firm’s changes to 
the quality window. Despite the significant pace of technological change in 
this industry, a typical firm does not introduce or withdraw products every 
quarter. On average, a firm withdraws obsolete qualities from the market 
only once every 2.5 quarters and it introduces new products only once every 
2.2 quarters. In some cases, firms do not withdraw product-qualities from 
their product lines for more than a year. This relative product-line rigidity 
is suggestive of the existence of fixed sunk adjustment costs: since modifying 
the product portfolio is not costless, firms do not optimally withdraw (or 
introduce) products every quarter, but only when the expected benefits of 
doing so exceed the costs.
However, there are potentially other possible explanations for this pattern 
of product-line adjustments tha t are not related to  the existence of adjust­
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ment costs. For instance, I consider a one-dimensional measure of quality and 
therefore I may not be able to capture changes to  a firm’s product line tha t 
affect product characteristics other than the speed of the CPU. However, I 
have verified th a t a product’s characteristics remain constant after its intro­
duction and therefore tha t I do not underestimate the frequency of changes to 
the marginal qualities sold by firms.
The relative rigidity of firms’ product lines may also reflect the discreteness 
of available CPUs speeds rather than the existence of adjustment costs. I have 
considered whether this discreteness is driving the pattern th a t I observe by 
comparing the product-fine changes tha t I observe to the set of feasible quality 
locations. I have found tha t when firms withdraw obsolete products from their 
product fines, they do so with a relative degree of lumpiness: they do not 
simply adjust to the next feasible quality location. This suggests tha t the 
behaviour th a t I observe does not simply derives from the potential rigidity 
imposed by a discrete choice set.
Finally, the evolution of PC manufacturers’ product fine may simply re­
flect the choices of important upstream manufacturers such as Intel: obsolete 
products may be withdrawn from the market simply because relative obsolete 
inputs become unavailable. The different inventory held by different manufac­
turers may drive the variation observed across different firms. However, even 
though the manufacturers are undoubtely subject to common technological 
shocks, the differences in firms’ product fines and in firms’ changes to product 
fines described by Figure 2-1 do not appear to be consistent with the idea tha t 
the evolution of firms’ product fines follows passively exogenous changes tha t 
take place in upstream input markets. I have not been able to find discontin­
uance information of Intel products but it should be noted tha t, in the period 
considered, Intel did not differentiate between desktop and laptop processors
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and, even though a PC processor became obsolete for desktops, it normally 
continued to be supplied for use in laptop computers and (even for a longer 
time) for embedded applications. For instance, in August 2007, Intel Pentium 
MMX processors, despite being completely obsolete for personal computers, 
are still produced by Intel and used in embedded applications. In the model 
th a t I present in this Chapter, product exit decisions are the result of non­
trivial economic choices taken by PC manufacturers and do not simply reflect 
the availability of relatively obsolete input components.
2.4 The m odel
The model describes a discrete-time industry with endogenous product entry, 
exit, and price-setting, where firms choose strategies in order to maximize the 
expected discounted value of their net future profits given their information 
set.
Each period t  =  1,2, ...,oo, there are N  consumers. At time £, each con­
sumer can purchase one of the products offered in the market or an outside 
option. The utility of consumer i from purchasing a product of quality qj sold
by firm /  at price p j f  is specified as
uijf  =  bf aqj  +  'ypjf +  £ijf =  Sjf +  £{jf
where bj  is a characteristic common to all product sold by firm /  and
is an i.i.d. extreme-value distributed error term . It is reasonable to assume 
tha t a  > 0 and 7  <  0. Utility can be decomposed into the mean-utility term  
Sjf = bf + aqj +  'ypjf and the stochastic component £ijf. Let £ 0  be the mean 
utility derived from the consumption of the outside option.
In the context of this dynamic model, the advantages of this simple logit
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demand system are substantial because the approach th a t I will use to reduce 
the dimensionality of the state space relies on the property of the logit demand 
system whereby demand for a product (and therefore its profits) depends only 
on the characteristics of the product and on the aggregate index of market 
output. Summarising market structure by means of a simple aggregate index 
of market output would have not been possible with more complex demand 
systems such as the random-coefficient logit (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 
1995), the (localised) pure-characteristic demand model (Berry and Pakes, 
2007) or the hedonic demand model developed by Bajari and Benkard (2005).
There are n  firms, indexed by /  =  1,..., n. Every period t, each firm sells 
a product line with no holes, which includes all feasible product-qualities in 
the interval <7/t] • As in Chapter 1 , 1 assume tha t there is a large number 
of feasible qualities, so tha t in the limit the quality space can be considered 
to be continuous for the purpose of studying firms’ product line decisions. A 
firm’s product line can therefore be fully characterised by the highest quality 
and by the lowest quality it sells, i.e. by qjt and by the "marginal quality"
2" '
The product-qualities sold by any firm are constrained by exogenous tech­
nological conditions. In particular, I assume th a t firms can sell any quality 
between 0 and the exogenous frontier of technology Qt . I assume tha t the fron­
tier of technology evolves according to the function Qt+i which
is parametrised by Aq .
All the products sold by a firm at time t share the characteristic bfu which 
is a vendor-specific shock that is observed each period only by firm /  in advance 
of product-line and pricing decisions and is therefore private information. I 
assume th a t the brand vendor shock is a random variable with cumulative 
distribution B , and has mean equal to 0  and variance equal to
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A product of quality qj is produced at constant marginal cost
ct (qj) = <f>tqj
This specification of technology implies tha t the marginal cost of produc­
tion is linearly increasing in the quality of the product, i.e. that there are 
constant returns to quality. I allow the marginal cost of quality 4> to change 
over time and I assume tha t 4>t+i evolves deterministically according to  the 
function <f>t+1 (4>t , Qt \ A ,^) which is parametrised by A^.
Production also entails the "fixed" cost F  { q ^ q ^ j  th a t does not depend 
on the firm’s output but tha t depends on the range of product-qualities it 
supplies. I assume tha t a firm th a t offers a wider product line incurs a higher 
fixed cost of production:
F { l r 9f ) = r ( q , - q f )
Each period t, the sequence of events is as follows:
1 . firms observe the aggregate index of market activity tha t was realized in 
period t — 1 (Of_i)
2 . firms observe the available technological conditions
3. each firm draws its random "brand" shock bft (which is private informa­
tion)
4. each firm chooses its product fine
5. each firm chooses the prices of the products it sells
6 . consumers make their purchase decisions.
79
Given the nature of firms’ product lines, the introduction and the with­
drawal of new products is fully described by changes to  qj  and q^. I assume 
tha t a firm incurs the fixed sunk adjustment cost T every time it modifies 
and the sunk adjustment cost T  every time it modifies qj.  Given the evo­
lution of product lines along the equilibrium path, T can be thought of as 
the sunk cost of withdrawing products and T  as the sunk cost of adding new 
product-qualities to the product line.
In the particular application of this model to the market for personal com­
puters that I consider in this Chapter, I interpret these costs as "adjustment" 
costs. However, the same modelling framework could also capture sunk costs 
of a different nature such as R&D outlays th a t must be incurred by a firm to 
develop new products of better quality. Also, even though I specify the "ad­
justment" cost as a fixed sunk outlay th a t must be incurred when products 
are added to or withdrawn from the product line, the model could easily be 
extended to account for variable sunk costs as well, a specification which could 
be more appropriate to model endogenous R&D investments.
Given the assumptions of the model, a firm’s period expected profits (at 
the beginning of the period) are given by the following expression
=  C2*1)
Saft ex P (bf t  +  <xq +  I V  f t  (? )) ip  f t  (q) -  M  dq
=  +
E  (Qt \Qt-i ,  <f>t, Qt)
~F (?/, -  qft)  ~ r • 1 (qn f  qst_x) — T • 1 (qff ±
  n _
where qft < Qt , M  is total sales, exP (&/t-i +  +  l P f t - \  (q)) dq
f= 1 -z*-1
is the aggregate index of market output observed by the firms a t time t  and
1  (•) is an indicator function tha t takes a value equal to 1 if the condition (•)
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is satisfied and a value equal to zero if it is not.1
A firm’s period expected (gross) profits depend on the product line it 
sells, qft, , on the marginal cost of quality <f> and on the expected aggregate 
index of market output fi that will be realised in the market, which fully 
summarises the impact of market structure on a firm’s profits.2 The frontier 
of technology Q constrains the changes that can be made to the firm’s product 
line which entail a fixed sunk cost.
All the information relevant to each firm / ’s current and future expected 
payoffs available at time t is summarised by two vectors of state variables Sft =  
£ Sf and st = [ f it-i,Qti4>t\ e  S. Vector Sff describes firm 
/ ’s product line at the beginning of the period and firm / ’s vendor shock which 
is observed (only) by firm /  at the beginning of the period before product-line 
and pricing decisions are taken.
The state vector St describes the available technology and the structure of 
the market, which are common knowledge. There are two technological state 
variables: the frontier of technology Qt and the marginal cost of quality <f>t.
The structure of the market is instead described by the aggregate index 
of market output f i * _ i .  In general, in order to characterise market structure, 
it is necessary to describe all products sold in the market by each firm =  
\oifti Qft\f ' However, in this model, the set of products sold in the 
market affects any product’s profitability only through the aggregate index of 
market output fi. By considering the index of market output rather than the 
entire set of qualities sold by each firm as the relevant market state variable, 
the dimension of the state space is greatly reduced: each firm does not have to 
keep track of the product line of each of its opponents but only of the evolution
^ e e  Chapter 1 for the derivation of the gross period profit function.
2 Notice that the aggregate index of market output depends on the realisation of firms’ 
brand shocks as well as product-line and pricing decisions.
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of the aggregate index of market output.
However, in the context of this dynamic model, using the aggregate in­
dex of market output f} to  summarise market structure \l> is not without loss 
of generality. One im portant assumption tha t is necessary to underpin this 
simplifying approach is that, if two industry structures have the same aggre­
gate index of market output at time t — 1 , then they must result in the same 
distribution of industry structures at time t. Let P  (•) be the (conditional) cu­
mulative probability distribution function of fi*. Specifically, I need to assume 
tha t
P(Qt \^ t - i ,  0t, Qt) = <f>u Qt)
For example, the index of market output could be high either because 
there are many products in the market all with high prices or because there 
is a single product in the market with a low price. If these scenarios result 
in the same index of market output, the assumption requires th a t they must 
imply the same expectation of the next-period index of market output. A 
similar simplifying assumption appears in Hendel and Nevo (2003) and in 
Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2006).
Alternatively, this approach could be justified by assuming tha t a firm’s 
product line is private information, i.e. tha t firms can only observe the ag­
gregate index of market output and not the individual products sold by their 
rivals, which could be a reasonable assumption in market with a large number 
of products.
Each period, each firm /  takes both pricing and product-fine decisions. 
Firm / ’s actions taken at time t are fully described by the vector
a /i = e  A f
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with < Qft+1 < Qt+i• Let af =  (a^, ...,ant) be the vector of all firms’ 
actions taken at time t .
A Markov strategy for firm /  is a function ay that maps each state into the 
action space: af : SxSf —+ Af. A strategy profile is the vector a =  (a\,..., an) 
of strategies for each firm. If behaviour is given by a Markov strategy profile, 
firm / ’s expected profits given s and s/  can be written recursively:
vf (s > s/|<r) =  7Tf  (af, s', sf) +  fi J  J  Vf (s', srf\a) dP (s'|<r, s) dB(s'f)
where P (s'|cr, s) is the firm’s perceived cumulative probability distribution 
P(s'|cr,s) over the state vector s and B(s'f) is the cumulative probability 
distribution of the firm’s brand shock in the vector S f .
The profile cr* is a Markov equilibrium if, given the expectation on the evo­
lution of the state vector, each firm /  prefers its strategy a*f to any alternative 
Markov strategy a'f :
Vf(s,Sf\a*f) ^Vf(s,sf\a'f)
and the probability distribution P (s'|er*, s) that governs the evolution of 
s given equilibrium behaviour is consistent with the perceived probability dis­
tribution P(s'|cr*,s):
P (s'|<7*, S) = P (s'|<T*, s)
In practice, this requires that the probability distribution Pq (f2'|<r*, s) 
that governs the evolution of the aggregate index of market output Q is con­
sistent with the perceived probability distribution Pq (n'|<7*, s).
Along the equilibrium path, therefore, firms take optimal pricing and 
product-line decisions with respect to a given distribution of future states
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and their optimal decisions generate industry transitions with the same dis­
tribution used in their optimisation.
In general, each firm’s decision has an impact on the aggregate index of 
market output and therefore on its evolution and firms take this impact into 
account when choosing optimal behaviour. However, I consider the case in 
which, even though the evolution of the evolution of the aggregate index of 
market output depends upon the decisions taken by all firms, the impact of a 
single firm’s decisions on the aggregate index of market output is negligible. 
In this case,
Pn(n'|<T*,s)=Pn(fi'|s)
Under this assumption, I can study optimal behaviour assuming that each 
firm takes the aggregate index of market output and its evolution over time 
as given when choosing the optimal pricing and product-line strategy. This 
is equivalent to the assumption of "monopolistic competition" that I adopted 
in Chapter 1 and it implies that pricing and product-line decisions are not 
affected by cannibalisation and by strategic considerations. Even though this 
is potentially a restrictive assumption, it is not unreasonable if the level of 
concentration at the product level is very low, as it is the case in the market 
for personal computers.3
If firms choose prices without considering the impact on the aggregate 
index of market output and on its evolution, pricing decisions are static and 
equivalent to those that I studied in Chapter 1, where I showed that optimal 
prices entail a constant markup above marginal costs:
Pft  (q) = Pt (q) =  ct ( q ) - -  =  4>tq -  -  (2.2)
7 7
3 Cannibalisation considerations in a vertically-differentiated market subject to techno­
logical change are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
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Given this optimal price-setting behaviour, firm / ’s Bellman equation is
2.5 Estim ation o f th e structural parameters
It is useful to organise the structural parameters of the model in three groups: 
0s =  [a, 7 , erf,], As =  |Aq, A^J and 0d =  [F, E, T ]. I do not attem pt to estimate 
the discount factor /?.
Vector 0s includes the structural parameters of demand ( a , j )  and the 
standard deviation at,. The parameters in the vector As characterise instead 
the evolution of the exogenous state variables Q and 4>. Finally, the parameter 
vector 0d includes the fixed cost of production F  and the sunk costs of adjust­
ment T and r : the ’’dynamic” parameters tha t are identified on the basis of 
firms’ product-line changes.
In theory, it would be possible to estimate all the parameters of the model 
in one step by using a nested fixed point approach tha t extends the method 
used by Rust (1987) for single-agent dynamic programming. The approach 
entails
•  computing an equilibrium to the dynamic model numerically given a 
parameter vector;
• using the computed values to evaluate an objective function based on 
the sample data; and
•  finding the param eter vector tha t maximises the objective function.
Jg/ exp(ag-l+7to) ( " ) d g
J  WdPh(w\n,4>fi)
=  max
- r - i  (* ,*? /)- r - i  (£ * £ ,)
+ f i f  J vf f a ,  i v  v, a ,  4>',q') dpQ (fi'in, <t>, q ) <i b  (V)
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In practice, however, the computational burden that results from the need 
to compute equilibria for each trial parameter value limits the practical feasi­
bility of this algorithm.
Instead, I estimate the model sequentially. First of all, I estimate 9s and 
the parameter vector Xs. I then derive an estimate of 0d following the two-step 
methodology developed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) by (i) estimating 
policy functions and (ii) finding the set of structural parameters that ratio­
nalise the observed policies as optimal decisions.
This approach is not as efficient as the nested fixed-point algorithm since 
it does not make full use of the structure of the model in the estimation. 
However, the main advantage of this sequential estimation approach is that 
it does not require the solution of the equilibrium of the dynamic game even 
once. For computational reasons, the importance of estimating the structural 
parameters without having to compute the equilibrium of the dynamic model 
is not to be underestimated. Also, as discussed in Chapter 1, a sequential 
estimation approach does not enforce the equilibrium conditions that derive 
from the supply-side of the model in the estimation of demand and therefore 
consistency of the estimates of the demand parameters does not depend on 
supply-side equilibrium assumptions and is robust to a wide set of possible 
assumptions.
2 .5 .1  S ta t ic  p a ra m eters
The "static" parameters are the marginal utility of quality a, the marginal 
utility of income 7, the marginal cost of quality <f) and the standard devia­
tion of the distribution of vendor shocks cq,. Demand is specified as a static 
multinomial logit model. The estimating equation that I use is similar to the
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one that I discussed in Chapter 1:
In (sjft) -  In (s0t) =  0£+ocqjt +  7pjft +  ejft
where "quality" is defined as the logarithm of the CPU benchmark and 
£ is a vector of time-vendor dummies {£ft}ft that capture both the vendor 
shocks that are unobserved by the econometrician but that are observed by 
firms in advance of setting prices and the (time-varying) value of the outside 
good:4 = bft +  Sot. ejft is an i.i.d. error term.5 In order to calculate the 
market shares used in the regression, I have considered the size of the market 
to be equal to the number of U.S. households.6
For the purpose of addressing problems of correlation between the price and 
the error term, as explained in detail in Chapter 1, 1 use Canadian prices as an 
instrument for the prices of the personal computers sold in the United States. 
The results of the estimation are reproduced in Table 2.3 where IV estimates 
are compared to simple OLS results and where I also provide the results of 
the estimation in the case in which all the product characteristics available in 
my dataset are included in the regression.7 Other alternative specifications of 
the demand system were presented and discussed in Chapter 1. I have also 
run a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity: the result suggests that it is 
possible to reject the hypothesis that OLS estimates are consistent at the 1% 
level.
4£ f t is a variable that takes value 1 for firm /  and time t  and value 0  otherwise.
5 Notice that the time-vendor dummies could potentially also control for the effect of 
advertising (at the vendor level) which is unobserved by the econometrician. Controlling 
for advertising can be important because, if advertising occurred when prices were reduced, 
advertising could bias the estimate of 7  upwards.
6 Notice that, given the full set of time vendor dummies included in the regression, market 
size does not actually affect the estimates of the parameters a  and 7 .
7 Given its large size, the vector of time-vendor dummies is not reported in the Table.
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In order to disentangle the vendor shocks bft from the value of the outside 
good Jot, I regress the estimated time-vendor dummies on time dummies:
£/t =  ^1 + ^ 2  +  +  2^6 +  uft
The results are reported in Table 2.4.1 use the residuals of this regression 
(uft) as an estimate of the vendor shocks bft and their standard deviation as 
an estimate of <r&, which I have found to be equal to 1.17.
As in Chapter 1, the estimated marginal utility of income 7  can be used 
to infer the marginal cost(s) of quality on the basis of the first-order-condition 
for optimal pricing given by expression 2.2. The estimating equation is
V (Vi) + 4 = <ptqi + uit 
7
The estimates of the time-varying marginal cost of quality are reported in 
Table 2.5. It can be noted th a t the average relative price-cost margin implied 
by the estimated marginal utility of income is about 25%. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, this is consistent with the average gross profit margin of the main 
PC manufacturers in the period considered of about 24% th a t I have recovered 
from the firms’ annual accounts.
The approach tha t I have adopted to the estimation of the marginal cost 
of quality is feasible because I have assumed tha t each firm ignores the im­
pact of its pricing decisions on the aggregate index of market output, and 
therefore on its evolution. If pricing decisions had a significant impact on the 
aggregate index of market output, then optimal pricing would entail dynamic 
considerations, i.e. prices would not simply maximise period profits.
2.5.2 Evolution of state variables
I need to  estimate the evolution of two exogenous state variables: the frontier 
of technology Q and the marginal cost of quality (f>. I have specified and 
estimated the following regressions:
Qt =  ^  + ^ Q t - i  +
and
4>t=  +  ^ >Q t-1
I have measured the frontier of technology Q by the average top quality 
sold by firms in the market each period .8 In the regressions, I have used the 
estimates of the marginal cost of quality (p th a t I had derived earlier. The 
estimated parameters are presented in Table 2.6 and in Table 2.7. Note tha t 
the reported standard errors are not corrected for the sample errors in the 
first-stage estimates.
In addition to these exogenous technological state variables, I also estimate 
the evolution of the aggregate index of market output. The aggregate index of 
market output is an endogenous variable at the industry level but, under the 
assumptions of the model, it is exogenous from the perspective of an individual 
firm and I can treat it as such when I estimate the dynamic parameters of the 
model (see below). I have specified the evolution of the aggregate index of 
market output as follows
log(ftt) =  Ajj +  log(Of_i) +
8 1 could have defined the frontier as the maximum quality sold in the market each period. 
However, since I will use the exogenous evolution of the frontier of technology in the simula­
tion of the industry equilibrium, considering the average top quality sold by firms captures 
better the evolution of the range of products sold in the market.
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Since I do not observe the true aggregate index of market output I 
construct an estimate as
= f exP f i f t  +  a q  +  vf>t q )  dq
where and (f>t are the estimated parameters th a t I had previously
derived. The regression results are reported in Table 2.8. Note again tha t 
the reported standard errors are not corrected for the sample errors in the 
first-stage estimates.
2 .5 .3  D y n a m ic  p a ra m eters
The estimation of the model requires also the recovery of three "dynamic" 
parameters: the fixed cost of production F , the sunk cost of adding new 
products to the product line T, and the sunk cost of withdrawing products 
from the product line T. These parameters are "dynamic" in the sense tha t 
they are identified on the basis of firms’ (dynamic) product-line decisions.
Given estimates of the parameter-vectors 0s and Xs, the fixed cost of pro­
duction and the sunk costs of adjustment are inferred through a two-step 
procedure. In the first step, I recover an estimate of the policy functions that 
describe firms’ product-line adjustments. In the second step, I find the dy­
namic parameters 0d tha t rationalise the observed policies as optimal given 
the theoretical model and the observed evolution of state variables. I do so by 
forward simulating a firm’s product line when it follows the estimated policy 
functions, given the evolution of exogenous state variables, and by calculat­
ing the firm’s simulated present-value profits as estimates of value functions. 
I then randomly perturbate the policy functions so as to generate different 
paths and different present-value payoffs. At the true parameters, the payoffs
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generated by the observed policies should be greater than  those generated by 
any other set of policies.
Formally, following Bajari et al. (2007), let x  index the equilibrium con­
ditions, so th a t each x  denotes a particular ^s, s / ,  o '^ j combination. The 
strategy profile cr is an equilibrium if and only if for all firms /  and all states 
s, S f
Vf  ^  Vf  (s ,s /;o ^ ;0 d)
Consider the difference between the value function when the optimal policy 
Of is followed and when another policy o f  is followed:
g (x; 0d, 0‘)  =  Vf  (s, sf , <x/; 8d, 0s)  -  V,  (s, af , 6d, 0s)
where cr is parametrised by 0 s .
Define the function
Q ( 0 d,9s' ) =  J  ( m in j p  (x;0d,0sSj  , o j )  dH (x)
where H  is the distribution of the set of inequalities considered. The true 
param eter vector satisfies
Q («o ,0o) = 0  = m m Q (e d,9 { j
In practice, 9d is estimated by minimising the sample analogue of Q (9d, 9q). 
In order to  do so, I consider a random set of inequalities by randomly 
perturbating the estimated policy functions.9 For each inequality, I use the 
forward simulation procedure to construct analogues of the Vf  terms and
9 The particular method for selecting inequalities will affect efficiency but the only re­
quirement for consistency is that H  has sufficient support to yield identification.
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g  (x; 6d, ) the empirical counterpart to g  (x; 6d, 0 g) which is computed by-
replacing Vf  with the simulated estimates.
The param eter vector 9d is estimated as
6d = arg min Q n (ed, 0 ^ j
where
^  n i    g
Q n ( e d, e°n)  =  —  J 2  (m in [ g  ( x t ; 6 i , <9*) , o } )
n /  k= 1
and n j is the number of simulation draws.
In order to  accelerate the estimation algorithm, I decompose the profit 
function into a linear function of its known and unknown components as sug­
gested by Bajari et al. (2007). The unknown components enter linearly into 
the payoffs of the firm in the current period and all future periods. I t is there­
fore possible to decompose the value function into the vector of parameters 
and the vectors of expected discounted payoffs and actions. I thus can write 
the value function as
Vf  ( s , s /; a / ;  9d j^ = W f  (s, s /; a f ) • 0d
This linearity avoids having to repeat the simulation procedure for each 
potential param eter value. Since W f  does not depend on 9d, I use the forward 
simulation procedure once to estimate W f  and then multiply by 9d to  estimate 
Vf for any value of 9d.
The first step of the estimation strategy tha t I have outlined entails the es­
timation of policy functions. In general, provided th a t the data is rich enough, 
policy functions can be estimated parametrically or non-parametrically. How­
ever, the economic environment tha t I consider is significantly non-stationary
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and therefore I do not observe the behaviour of firms at any given state repeat­
edly. I therefore rely on a parametric specification of firms’ optimal behaviour 
to inform the forward-simulation procedure.
In the absence of clear theoretical results on the nature of optimal product- 
line decisions, the specification of policy functions necessarily involves a prag­
matic approach. In general, in the presence of fixed product-line adjustment 
costs, the description of optimal behaviour requires the specification of two 
elements: (i) when the adjustment occurs and (ii) the level of the adjustment. 
I follow a large literature on optimal behaviour in the presence of fixed sunk 
adjustment costs and specify policy functions as (S', s) rules. Because of the 
difficulties in proving the optimality of an (S , s) rule, a pragmatic approach 
of this kind in the presence of fixed sunk adjustment costs was followed, for 
instance, by Attanasio (2000) and by Ryan (2007).
When the optimal introduction (withdrawal) of products takes the form 
of an (<9, s) rule, policy functions can be described by the specification of a 
band: the adjustment takes place if and only if the firm’s state is below a 
certain threshold s and the firm adjusts to a target level S . Both s and S  
are in general a function of state variables. In order to characterise optimal 
behaviour, it is thus necessary to  specify and estimate (only) the threshold s 
and the target level S.
I consider separately the (S', s) rule th a t governs the withdrawal of product 
from the product line (i.e. changes to the marginal quality q^) and the (S , s) 
rule that underlies the introduction of new products to  the product fine (i.e. 
changes to <fy) . 10 Under the assumption tha t each threshold and target level
10 This approach is justified by the fact that I explicitely control for the vendor brand 
shocks and, under the asssumption of monopolistic competition, the firm does not consider 
the impact that one product in its product line has on the other products it sells and by the 
fact that the sunk cost of introducing new products in the product line is additional to the
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are observable when a firm makes an adjustment, it is possible to recover 
consistent estimates of the policy functions using simple OLS regressions. 11 In 
general, it is desirable to use a flexible high-order polynomial, so as to minimise 
the imposition of possibly unjustified a priori param etric restrictions on policy 
functions. However, I have found tha t relatively parsimonious regressions 
describe rather well the evolution of product-lines th a t I observe in the data.
The threshold for the marginal quality, qs, determines when a firm opti­
mally withdraws obsolete products from the product line. In order to estimate 
the threshold for q, I consider all those cases in which a firm changes the mar­
ginal quality it sells and I regress the firm’s marginal quality before the change 
on the lagged market state fi, on the technology state 0  and on the firm’s brand 
shock b th a t I previously recovered. The estimated threshold is
q° =  4.875 +  0.179 log -  4.5460, +  0.0236*
M (0 .86) (0 .05) (1 .58) (0 .02)
In order to estimate the target level for q, qs , I regress the observed mar­
ginal quality sold by a firm on the lagged index of aggregate output Q, on the 
technology state 0  and on the firm’s brand shock b every period in which I 
observe a change of the marginal quality sold by a firm. I have estimated the 
target marginal quality as
q f =  4.471 +  0.203 log -  2.2340, +  0.0436*
(0 .73) (0 .04) (1 .34 ) (0 .02)
Turning now the optimal introduction of new products in the product line, 
I estimate the threshold qs by considering all the instances in which a firm 
introduces new better qualities to its product line. In particular, if I observe
sunk cost of withdrawing products from the product line.
11 See Ryan (2005) and Attanasio (2000).
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a change in period t, I regress the firm’s top-quality sold in period t — 1, qu  
on Qt :
qst = 0.97 Qt(0.003)
I assume th a t when firms introduce new products to their product lines, 
they introduce all qualities up to  the available frontier of technology, i.e. the 
target is qt+1 = Qt .12
Since I deal with a non-stationary environment, caution is necessary in 
interpreting the policy functions tha t I have recovered as structural relation­
ships. In particular, it is necessary to acknowledge tha t the estimated policy 
functions may not well capture optimal behaviour in states th a t are signifi­
cantly different to those tha t I observe in the sample. I will account for this 
limitation of the estimated policy function, i.e. for possible out-of-sample 
error, in the second step of the estimation approach.
The assumption tha t the product-line changes tha t I observe in the data, as 
described by the estimated (S , s) rules, reflect optimal behaviour underpins the 
empirical strategy th a t I use to estimate the vector of "dynamic" parameters.
In the second-step of the estimation, I use the estimated policy functions, 
and the estimated processes governing the evolution of exogenous state vari­
ables, to simulate forward the evolution of firms’ product lines so as to calculate 
the present value of simulated profits as an estimate of the value function. I 
have considered 30,000 simulations and for each simulation 200 random paths 
of brand shocks.
In order to construct estimates of the value function at different states, I 
have focused on the range of states tha t I observe in my sample.
In general, it is desirable to simulate the evolution of firms’ product line for
12This is consistent with my model in which there are no sunk variable costs of product 
introduction and in which period profits are increasing in the quality of the product.
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a large number of periods, so tha t payoffs towards the end of the time-horizon 
have a very low discounted present value. In order to correctly calculate 
the value function given optimal behaviour, it is also necessary to rely on 
estimated policy functions tha t apply in all the states tha t are visited in the 
simulated evolution of the industry. However, as I noticed above, given the 
non-stationarity of the economic environment th a t I consider, I do not think 
tha t it is reasonable to interpret the policy functions tha t I have estimated as 
structural relationships tha t necessarily describe well optimal behaviour also 
in states that are significantly different to those th a t I observe in my sample. 
The length of the industry simulation should thus be chosen so as to strike 
a balance between the possible out-of-sample prediction error of using the 
estimated policy functions and the error in estimating the value function as 
the present value of simulated profits in a limited number of periods only.13 
I have used a time-horizon of 30 periods to simulate the evolution of the 
industry. As a sensitivity check, I have verified th a t changing the length of 
the simulation does not actually materially affect the estimates obtained.
I then construct alternative paths of product lines evolution by randomly 
perturbating the. estimated target level and the threshold for q and the esti­
mated threshold for q by adding stochastic shocks drawn from normal distri­
butions. I compute the present value of the simulated profits associated with 
these alternative policies and I use the inequality estimator described in sec­
tion 2.5.3 to infer the parameter vector 0d. Intuitively, the param eter vector is 
estimated as tha t which rationalises the estimated policy functions as optimal 
given the evolution of exogenous state variables.
The estimates of F, T and T tha t I have obtained are reported in Table 2.9.
13 More generally, these considerations suggest that it would be reasonable to put more 
weight on the information provided by state configurations that I observe in the early periods 
of the sample.
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I do not provide the standard errors for these estimates. The main source of 
variance is the sample error in the first-step estimates and the estimation would 
require the use of subsampling or of the bootstrap. I leave the calculation of 
the standard errors of these dynamic parameters to  future research.
The estimate of F  th a t I have obtained is $72.3 millions, which is higher 
tha t the estimate of $49.9 millions th a t I obtained in the static model of 
Chapter 1. By calculating standard errors, it would be possible to assess if the 
difference is statistically significant. The estimated fixed cost of production is 
about 60% of average period gross profits.
The estimate of the sunk cost of introducing new products in the prod­
uct line T is $4.1 millions and the estimate of the sunk cost of withdrawing 
products from the product line T is $2.2 millions. The estimated sunk cost 
of introducing new products is higher than estimated the sunk cost of with­
drawing products from the product line, which is reasonable . 14 Unfortunately, 
however, I have not been able to identify any available source of external data  
tha t I could use as a benchmark to compare the estimates of product-line 
adjustment costs th a t I have obtained.
2.6 Simulation o f industry evolution and counter- 
factual analysis
Having estimated its structure, I use a simplified version of the model as a 
tool to  simulate the evolution of the industry, i.e. to  replicate the product- 
line dynamics tha t I observe in my sample, and to study the impact th a t 
the existence of product-line adjustment costs has on firms’ profitability. In
14 However, without estimates of standard errors, it is not possible to assesswhether or not 
the difference between the two estimates is statistically significant.
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particular, in the simulations th a t I present in this section, I focus on product 
exit as the only endogenous dynamic decision taken by firms: in order to  ease 
the numerical analysis, I assume th a t firms introduce new better products 
in their product lines as soon as it is feasible to do so given the exogenous 
evolution of the frontier of technology. Also, I do not consider the firm-specific 
vendor shocks as they significantly increase the dimension of the state space.
Table 2.10 summarises the parameters of the model th a t I have used for 
the simulation and Table 2.11 describes the initial conditions tha t I have set, 
which match the states tha t I observe/have estimated in the first period of 
my sample .15 The specification of the initial conditions is im portant because, 
given the non-stationarity of the market environment th a t I consider, I use the 
model to  reproduce the evolution of the industry over a specific time horizon, 
starting from the same initial conditions tha t I observe in the market, rather 
than focusing on the long-run equilibrium of the industry.
Given the nature of the evolution of the exogenous state  variables th a t I 
consider, the market environment th a t I study does not have a bounded state 
space. For instance, the technological frontier shifts continuously forward, 
w ithout approaching an upper bound. This unboundedness would imply th a t 
innovative opportunities to improve the quality of personal computers would 
never fade away and therefore may not be reasonable in the very long run. In 
addition, it also poses a problem in solving the model numerically since this 
requires the specification of a bounded state space. There is no good general 
solution to dealing with unbounded state spaces and the approach tha t I have 
adopted is to consider a truncated but "sufficiently large” state  space.
I believe th a t this solution is satisfactory because I am not interested in
15 Notice that, since the model is not able to capture inter-firm variation in product-line 
dynamics, I have considered the simplified case in which the initial state configuration is 
such that all firms sell the same range of product-qualities.
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the properties of the industry equilibrium in the long-run but in simulating 
the evolution of the industry for limited number of periods so as to  match 
the industry evolution tha t I observe in my sample. Even though I consider 
a truncated bounded state space, as long as this state space is sufficiently 
larger than the state space tha t I would expect to encounter in practice given 
the estimated processes governing the evolution of the state variables over the 
number of periods tha t I am interested into, I should be able to  characterise 
with a sufficient degree of accuracy the equilibrium of the model over this 
limited time-horizon.
I solve the model using a nested fixed-point algorithm to implement the 
"rational expectation" equilibrium in which optimal decisions are consistent 
with the evolution of the aggregate index of market activity generated by 
the optimal behaviour of all firms. The inner fixed point solves for the value 
function given firms’ beliefs over the evolution of the index of market output. 
The outer algorithm derives an estimate of the evolution of the index of market 
output by simulating the evolution of the industry given optimal behaviour 
as resulting from the inner fixed point. The equilibrium is found when the 
simulated evolution of the index of market activity is consistent with firms’ 
beliefs.
I have simulated the evolution of the industry for 40 periods but I only 
report the results of the first 26 periods, so as to match the time horizon 
tha t I observe in the data. Figure 2-3 compares the estimated quality window 
(continuous lines) with the average range of qualities observed in the market 
(dotted lines) over the period 1995Q1-2001Q2.16
The simulated evolution of the marginal quality q matches relatively well
16 Notice that the bottom dotted line is an average across firms in the sample and therefore 
smoother than the estimated lower bound.
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the evolution of the range of qualities sold in the market for personal comput­
ers, even though it tends to  overestimate the average marginal quality, and 
it captures the discontinuous nature of product-line adjustments tha t char­
acterises firms’ changes to product lines. However, it should also be noted 
tha t the simulation tends to  underestimate the frequency of product-line ad­
justm ents compared to what I observe in my dataset: while in my dataset I 
observe tha t an average firm modifies the marginal quality it sells once every 
2.5 quarters, in the simulated path of product line evolution the adjustment 
takes place every 3.7 quarters.
The main benefit of estimating a structural model is the ability to simulate 
the effect of changes to the model primitives on equilibrium outcomes in the 
absence of relevant natural experiments. In particular, I have used the model 
to study the impact tha t a reduction in the level of adjustment costs (to 
withdraw products from the product line) has on a firm’s profitability.
From the perspective of an individual firm, i.e. for a given evolution of 
the aggregate market state, adjustment costs negatively affect profitability in 
two ways. First of all, the firm must incur the outlay every time it changes its 
product line. In addition, in the presence of adjustment costs, the firm will sell 
a product line tha t is sub-optimal in the sense th a t it does not maximise period 
profits, even though the product line is optimal in a dynamic perspective: 
because of (optimal) product-line rigidity, each period the firm may be selling 
products th a t are not profitable or it may not be selling profitable products. In 
equilibrium, however, the impact of adjustment costs on a firm’s profitability 
depends also on the impact tha t it has on the product lines sold by the firms’ 
rivals, i.e. on the aggregate market state, and it is not clear a priori.
I have used the model presented in this Chapter to investigate the impact 
of adjustment costs of firms’ profitability by simulating, over the 26-period
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time horizon, the products sold by a representative firm in the equilibrium 
when there are no adjustment costs, i.e. T = 0. Figure 2-4 shows the dif­
ference between the evolution of the representative firm’s product line with 
(dotted line) and without (continuous line) adjustment costs . 17 It is evident 
tha t, when there are no adjustment costs, the withdrawal of obsolete prod­
ucts occurs more frequently since firms are able to  adjust their product lines 
every quarter to adapt to technological and market conditions (the introduc­
tion of new better products in the market and the change in the marginal 
cost of production). The comparison is also useful to understand the nature 
of product-line adjustments in the presence of adjustment costs: when a firm 
adjusts its product line, it generally chooses a marginal quality tha t is higher 
than the marginal quality th a t would maximise period profits and keeps this 
quality on the market for longer than would be optimal if there were no ad­
justm ent costs.
I have computed the present value of firm’s profit in the status quo with 
adjustment costs and in the hypothetical counterfactual scenario with no ad­
justm ent costs. I have found that, in equilibrium, the existence of adjustment 
costs decreases (the present value of) a firm’s profits by approximately $32 mil­
lions over the period considered, with adjustment-cost outlays of about $ 1 1  
millions (in present value) accounting for only about one third of the overall 
difference in profits. This result suggests tha t the indirect impact of adjust­
ment costs on firm’s profitability is significantly larger than the direct impact, 
i.e. than adjustment costs outlays.
17 Notice that the evolution of the marginal quality sold in the market is smoother than 
the one obtained in Chapter 1. The main reason is that in this dynamic model, in order to 
reduce the dimensionality of the state space, I have not considered changes to market size, 
i.e. total sales, over time.
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2.7 Conclusions
In this Chapter I have developed a dynamic model of product-line decisions 
in which adding products to  and withdrawing products from a firm’s product 
fine entails a sunk cost.
Modelling dynamic behaviour in a differentiated and technologically evolv­
ing market with a relatively large number of firms is particularly challenging 
because of the computational burden of solving a dynamic programming prob­
lem with a large and potentially unmanageable state space. In this Chapter I 
have dealt with the problem of dimensionality by relying on a model in which 
the impact of market structure on profits can be fully described by a simple 
aggregate index of market output. Firms can therefore take product-line de­
cisions on the basis of this aggregate index of market output, rather than on 
the basis of the detailed consideration of all products sold in the market, as 
the relevant market state variable.
I have estimated the structure of this model by using the approach devel­
oped by Bajari et al. (2007), which entails recovering policy functions from 
the data and then finding the parameters tha t rationalise the estimated policy 
functions as optimal. This approach is not computationally demanding since 
it does not involve solving for the equilibrium of the dynamic model even once. 
In particular, I have derived estimates of the sunk costs tha t firms incur when 
adding products to and withdrawing products from their product lines. To 
the best of my knowledge, this is the first structural empirical study to  derive 
estimates of product-line adjustment costs.
I have used the model to simulate firms’ product line decisions and the en­
dogenous evolution of the "quality window" in the market for personal comput­
ers. The model matches relatively well the evolution of the range of qualities 
and the rigidity of firms’ product lines in the market for personal computers.
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I have also used this structural model to study the impact th a t product- 
line adjustment costs have on a firm’s profitability by simulating the impact 
of a change in the level of adjustment costs. I have found th a t the existence 
of adjustment costs decreases firms’ profits in equilibrium and th a t the main 
impact is indirect: adjustment costs outlays as such account for only one third 
on the reduction in (the present value of) profits.
The model can be improved and developed in a number of directions.
F irst of all, the model would significantly benefit from the use of a demand 
system tha t is better suited than the logit to deal with markets in which there 
is a large number of products. However, the potential advantages of a different 
demand system need also to be weighted against any potential disadvantages 
for the analysis of the supply-side of the model. In particular, in this model 
I have been able to deal with a very complex market environment because I 
have used a specification in which the impact of market structure on a firm’s 
profitability can be summarised by a simple scalar. This is a property tha t 
crucially depends on the choice of the demand system.
At present, the simulation tha t I have presented does not match the inter­
firm product-line variation found in the data. This variation could be driven 
by the idiosyncratic vendor shocks th a t I have considered in the model, but 
their consideration in the simulation significantly increases the state space and 
raises computational problems tha t need to be addressed.
Finally, I have considered a model of monopolistic competition. In this 
model, even though the evolution of the industry reflects the choices made 
by all firms, each firm does not consider its decisions to have a material im­
pact on the market. This is probably a reasonable assumption for the rather 
fragmented market for personal computers. However, in industries with fewer 
firms it may be desirable to account for strategic interaction in order to un-
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derstand endogenous product differentiation.
2.8 Tables
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of lowest qualities sold by firms
Period Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1 4.53 0 .1 2 4.25 4.57
2 4.53 0 .1 2 4.25 4.57
3 4.64 0.35 4.25 5.38
4 4.64 0.35 4.25 5.38
5 4.99 0.50 4.25 5.38
6 5.15 0.39 4.57 5.38
7 5.30 0.33 4.57 5.61
8 5.39 0 .1 1 5.22 5.61
9 5.56 0.07 5.49 5.65
1 0 5.56 0.07 5.49 5.65
11 5.61 0.18 5.49 5.99
1 2 5.89 0.13 5.75 5.99
13 5.96 0 .2 1 5.75 6.38
14 6.03 0.23 5.75 6.38
15 6.07 0 .2 1 5.87 6.38
16 6.37 0.35 5.87 6.85
17 6.64 0.24 6.26 6.91
18 6 .6 8 0 .2 2 6.35 6.85
19 6.74 0.18 6.35 6.85
2 0 6.89 0 .1 1 6.75 7.03
2 1 7.03 0.17 6.85 7.31
2 2 7.10 0.18 6.85 7.31
23 7.17 0.23 6.85 7.41
24 7.18 0.24 6.85 7.48
25 7.39 0.27 6.92 7.73
26 7.47 0 .2 2 7.04 7.73
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of highest qualities sold by firms
Period Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1 5.41 0.19 5.22 5.61
2 5.53 0.09 5.38 5.61
3 5.56 0.06 5.49 5.61
4 5.84 0.29 5.61 6 .2 1
5 5.93 0.29 5.61 6.32
6 5.98 0.33 5.63 6.32
7 6.08 0.31 5.75 6.32
8 6 .2 0 0.17 5.87 6.32
9 6.27 0 .1 0 6.13 6.32
1 0 6 .6 6 0 .0 0 6 .6 6 6 .6 6
11 6 .6 6 0 .0 0 6 .6 6 6 .6 6
1 2 6.81 0.06 6.75 6.91
13 7.10 0.19 6.75 7.31
14 7.15 0 .1 2 7.03 7.31
15 7.15 0 .1 2 7.03 7.30
16 7.15 0 .1 2 7.03 7.31
17 7.40 0.13 7.12 7.48
18 7.44 0.04 7.41 7.48
19 7.44 0.04 7.41 7.48
2 0 7.58 0 .1 2 7.41 7.73
2 1 7.97 0 .1 1 7.90 8 .2 0
2 2 8 .0 0 0 .1 2 7.83 8 .2 0
23 8 .0 0 0 .1 2 7.83 8 .2 0
24 8 .0 1 0 .1 2 7.83 8 .2 0
25 8 .0 1 0 .1 2 7.83 8 .2 0
26 8.16 0.19 7.83 8.42
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Table 2.3: Estimation of demand
OLS OLS IV IVCoefficient estimates estimates estimates estimates(standard error) (standard eror) (standard eror) (standard eror)
Q uality (a:) 1.59* 0.93* 2 .0 0 * 1.46*(0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.46)
Price  (7 ) - 1 .8 6 * -1.49* -2.27* -2.08*(0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18)
R A M - 0 .0 0 1 -0.0003(0.002) (0.002)
H ard disk 0.03* -0.03*(0.01) (0.01)
C D  -  R O M 0.69* 0.59*(0.22) (0.22)
M odemspeed 0 .0 2 * 0 .0 2 *(0.002) (0.002)
E thernet -0.65* -0.59*(0.15) (0.15)
D V D 0.45* 0.46*(0.15) (0.15)
Soundcard 0.07 0.08(0.14) (0.14)
M onitor 2.60* 2.19*(0.36) (0.37)
M onitorsize -0.15* -0.14*(0.02) (0.02)
& 0.46 0.53 0.45 0.53
N 1,703 1,703 1,703 1,703
* : statistically significant at the 1% level
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Table 2.4: Regression of time-vendor dummies
Period Coefficient Standard deviation
t l -13.57 0.48




t 6 -15.10 0.48
t7 -14.80 0.48
t 8 -15.58 0.48
t9 -15.90 0.48
tio -16.75 0.48
t i l -17.20 0.48




t l 6 -18.51 0.48
tl7 -19.07 0.48
t l 8 -19.48 0.48
tl9 -19.49 0.48
t 2 0 -19.95 0.48
t 2 1 -21.36 0.48





R 2 = 0.99 
N  = 182
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Table 2.5: Estimation of the marginal cost of quality






6 339.51 1 2 .2 2
7 330.83 11.45
8 289.35 10.37
9 279.89 1 0 .1 2
1 0 271.12 8.53
11 242.13 8.32








2 0 117.87 8.75
2 1 131.30 6.38
2 2 123.58 6.59
23 115.21 6.61
24 105.53 6 .2 0
25 96.12 6.78
26 93.09 6 .1 1
R 2 = 0.91 
N  = 1,703
110
Table 2.6: Evolution of the frontier of technology










Table 2.7: Evolution of the marginal cost of quality
Param eter Estimate(standard eror)
Al 0.243
















Table 2.9: Estimation of dynamic parameters
Param eter Estimate ($m)
Fixed cost of production (F ) 72.3
Sunk cost of withdrawing products (£) 2.2
Sunk cost of introducing new products QT) 4.1
Table 2.10: Parameters used for the model simulation










F  72.3 m
£  2.2m
M  1.8 m











Figure 2-1: Evolution of firms’ product lines
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Figure 2-3: Simulated quality window
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Optimal product-line design, 
cannibalisation and product 
replacement
3.1 Introduction
In vertically-differentiated industries, technological progress often allows firms 
to sell new products of better quality. In some cases, innovation results in 
"product proliferation": the firm adds the new product to its product line 
alongside existing products thereby expanding the range of product-qualities 
supplied to consumers. For instance, in the market for laser printers, de 
Figueiredo and Kyle (2006) show tha t the introduction of new faster printers 
has not been associated with the exit of slower printers from the market.
Often, however, innovation has a destructive impact and the introduction 
of new better products is accompanied with the withdrawal of existing prod­
ucts from the market. In some cases, the destructive impact of innovation has
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a localised nature and it takes the form of product upgrading whereby an ex­
isting product is replaced by a new better version. For instance, it is common 
for car manufacturers to introduce new "generations” of their models with 
improved design and engineering, which often receive also a mid-life "facelift". 
In other markets, however, product innovation has a non-localised destructive 
impact th a t affects products th a t are distant in the characteristics space. For 
instance, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the introduction of new better 
personal computers is associated with the exit of relatively obsolete personal 
computers at the bottom of the quality ladder.
In the previous Chapters, I developed two empirical structural models to 
study equilibrium product lines the market for personal computers and their 
evolution in the presence of ongoing technological progress. In these models, I 
explained the equilibrium range of qualities sold in the market as the result of 
competition among a set of monopolistically competitive firms. The analysis 
abstracted from strategic competition and from cannibalisation considerations 
but it nevertheless captured well the dynamic process of economic obsolescence 
in the market for personal computers in the form of a moving quality window 
driven by competitive forces.
In this Chapter I complement the analysis of the previous two Chapters 
by studying the cannibalisation considerations th a t shape a firm’s vertically- 
differentiated optimal product line in the presence of product innovation. To 
be clear, the purpose of the analysis in this Chapter is not to investigate the 
market for personal computers further, but to develop a more general theoret­
ical analysis of product exit decisions driven by cannibalisation considerations 
in vertically differentiated markets. By its nature,.the model tha t I discuss 
is extremely general and can be applied to  understand product-line decisions 
observed in a variety of industries. In particular it is best suited to  explain
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the localised product replacement decisions th a t are common in many dy­
namic markets such as the one for cars and the one for digital cameras and, 
by contrast, the proliferation of products in the quality space th a t is common 
in other industries such as the one for laser printers.
In order to identify under what circumstances innovation is accompanied 
with creative destruction  rather than with product proliferation, I consider 
a vertical-differentiation model under very general specifications of utility and 
technology in which a monopolist optimally chooses what products to sell 
among an exogenous set of feasible product-qualities. I focus my analysis on 
the behaviour of a monopolist in order to be able to study intra-firm cannibal­
isation considerations without having to  worry about the effects of inter-firm 
competition on product-line decisions (as those th a t I investigated in the first 
two chapters of this thesis).
I study the impact tha t supplying a (new) product has on the incentives 
of the monopolist to include other products in the optimal product line and 
I present a necessary and sufficient condition for product replacement to be 
optimal. My model generalises the analysis of Siebert (2003) who concluded 
that an innovator is always better off by withdrawing the lower quality product 
in order to avoid cannibalisation. In particular, I show th a t product exit is 
optimal only in some cases (which I state as restrictions to the surplus function) 
and tha t Siebert’s result stems from his specific functional specification of 
utility and technology.
The results tha t I obtain suggest also tha t cannibalisation considerations 
can well explain localised product replacement in the form of product upgrad­
ing that is witnessed in many markets (e.g. the market for cars and the market 
for digital cameras) where the introduction of a new product is associated with 
the exit of a neighbouring product in the quality space. However, cannibal-
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isation considerations appear to be less relevant to  explain the relationship 
between the introduction of new products and the exit of products tha t are 
distant in the quality space such as the one underlying the "moving quality 
window" observed in the market for personal computers th a t I studied in the 
previous Chapters, where shifts of the frontier of the technology are associated 
with the ordered exit of products at the bottom end of the quality ladder.
The next section briefly surveys the literature related to this study. Section 
3.3 lays out the model. Section 3.4 presents the analysis of cannibalisation and 
optimal product line design. Final conclusions follow.
3.2 Related literature
From a modelling perspective, the vertical differentiation models tha t are most 
closely related to this study are those anlaysed by de Fraja (1996) and by 
Johnson and Myatt (2003, 2006), who also consider a specification of the 
vertical differentiation model in which there is an exogenous discrete set of 
feasible quality locations, de Fraja (1996) considers an oligopoly model of 
vertical differentiation with multiproduct firms competing a la Cournot and 
derives a number of results proving existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. 
Johnson and Myatt (2004,2006) consider also a model in which multi-product 
firms choose the optimal set of qualities to supply. They develop an original 
approach to analyse the model, based on the notion of ’’upgrades” , and present 
a number of interesting results concerning equilibrium product lines and the 
impact of competition of the products sold in the market. Even though I 
do not consider an oligopolistic model, I study optimal product lines under a 
more general specification of utility and technology than de Fraja’s and my 
analysis does not follow Johnson and M yatt’s upgrade approach.
Given my focus on product replacement, this study also contributes to the
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literature on product exit, which spans the boundary between economics and 
marketing.
Stavins (1995) considers entry and exit at the model level in the market for 
personal computers. She estimates a logit model of the probability of exit in a 
given year, in which explanatory variables include measures of overpricing of 
models as well as firm and model characteristics. She concludes th a t overpriced 
models are more likely to exit the market. The probability of exit is also higher 
for products tha t have been on the market for longer and for products sold by 
new entrants.
Greenstein and Wade (1998) investigate product life cycles in the commer­
cial mainframe computer market. They also find tha t as products age their 
probability of exiting the market increases. They also show th a t exit rates are 
influenced by competition from within a product’s size class as well as from 
competition in surrounding niches. In addition, they also find th a t once a firm 
introduces a new product in a size class, other products from th a t firm in tha t 
niche are more likely to exit.
De Figueiredo and Kyle (2006) study product turnover in the laser print 
industry. They show tha t a product is more prone to exit the older it is and 
the more products are in the market and in the same niche. Printers on the 
frontier of resolution survive longer on the market than less advanced products. 
Firms with strong brands are less likely to withdraw their products from the 
market. Contrary to  the findings of Greenstein and Wade they do not find 
tha t exit is more likely when a firm introduces an additional product in the 
same niche.
Requena and Walker (2003) study product entry and exit in the car in­
dustry and show th a t exit is mainly driven by the introduction of new models 
in the same market segment. Genakos (2005) documents instead the short­
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ening of product life cycles in the market for personal computers. Chisholm 
and Norman (2005) study optimal exit decisions in the U.S. motion-pictures 
exhibition market.
The empirical literature, however, often laments the lack of theoretical 
foundations to the study of product exit. Indeed, there are only few theoretical 
papers tha t consider the decision by a firm to withdraw existing products.
Judd (1985) considers the decision by an incumbent to  keep or withdraw a 
product in the presence of entry in a horizontally differentiated market. One 
the one hand, keeping the product in the market increases sales but reduces 
the price of its other products. On the other hand, withdrawing the product 
reduces sales but increase the prices of its other products. In Judd’s horizontal 
differentiation model, the firm is better off by withdrawing the products tha t 
are close to those sold by the entrant to soften price competition.
Siebert (2003) considers product withdrawal in a vertical-differentiation 
model and concludes tha t the innovator is always better off by withdrawing 
the lower quality product in order to  avoid cannibalisation. By considering 
a more general specification of the model, I am able to show th a t it is not 
always optimal for the monopolist to withdraw the low-quality product from 
the market and, in fact, I derive a necessary and sufficient condition for product 
replacement to be optimal.
3.3 The m odel
There is a population of heterogeneous consumers, whose willingness to pay 
for quality 0  is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function 
F  (0) with support on [0,0] 6  3ft+ . I assume th a t F  (0) is continuous and twice 
differentiable.
A consumer of type 0 derives net utility u (0, qi)—pi from the consumption
123
of good of quality qi purchased at price p*. I assume th a t u  (9, q') — u  (0, q) 
is strictly increasing in 9 whenever qr > q, i.e. th a t ue (9,qf) > ug(9,q).  
This condition implies tha t consumers of higher type value an increase in 
the quality of the good more than  consumers of lower type and ensures tha t 
the indifference curves of any two types of consumers cross a t most once in 
price-quality space and tha t the associated demand curves do not intersect.
The monopolist can supply any of N  feasible qualities in the exogenous 
set =  {qi, (72, g;v}- Quality qi can be produced at constant marginal cost 
c(qi) = ci. Denote the quality of the outside option by go aud normalise its 
price po to zero.
The monopolist offers a menu of feasible qualities (q G f2,p(g)) to  max­
imise expected profits, given th a t consumers will select from the schedule to 
maximise individual utilities. Following the revelation approach, I consider 
the mechanism
M = {p(e) ,q{O)en,0€  [£,5]}
whereby a consumer who reports type 9 is assigned quality q (9) , belonging to 
the set of feasible qualities , and pays price p (9).
According to the revelation principle, in order to  solve for the optimal 
mechanism, it is possible to focus on those allocations tha t can be truthfully 
implemented.
An allocation can be truthfully implemented if it is individually rational 
and incentive compatible. Individual rationality requires th a t any consumer 
who purchases a good q (9) at price p (9) enjoys a utility th a t is no lower than 
th a t of the outside option:
u ( 9 , q ( 9 ) ) - p ( 9 )  > u ( 9 , q 0)
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Incentive compatibility requires that, conditional on buying some good, a 
consumer of type Qi must (weakly) prefer allocation (q (Qi) ,p(Qi)) rather than 
any other allocation offered by the monopolist:
u  (0i, q (0*)) -  P  (0i) > u  (i9i , q (Qj ) )  -  p  (Qj)
for any Qj 7  ^Qi.
An equilibrium allocation is an implementable allocation th a t maximises 
the monopolist’s profits. The optimal allocation therefore solves:
6
, [  \ p ( Q ) - c ( q ( Q ) ) \ d F ( Q )q{9)en,P(0) J 
0
subject to
u(Q, q (0)) — p (Q) > u (Q, q (Q')) — p (Qr) for any Q, Q' 7  ^Q
and
u(Q,q(Q))~p(Q) > u(Q ,q0)
I now present a number of results tha t allow me to  simplify the maximisa­
tion problem th a t determines the equilibrium allocation. F irst of all, I present 
two standard results on implementable allocations. I then suggest that, in 
any implementable allocation, there is a one-to-one relationship between the 
quality allocation q (Q) and a vector of marginal consumers 0 =  [0i, 02> 0/v]-
This implies th a t choosing q(Q) is equivalent to choosing N  marginal con­
sumers Qi such th a t all consumer types Q : Qi+\ > Q > Qi are allocated, i.e. 
consume, quality qi. I then identify the unique price schedule p tha t opti­
mally implements a given quality allocation 0. These results will allow me
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to  rewrite the maximisation problem of the monopolist as the choice of N  
marginal consumers, i.e. the vector 0, given the optimal implementing price 
schedule p.
Claim  3.1 (%) In any implementable allocation, all consumers who are allo­
cated the same quality must pay the same price, i.e. p(Q) = p(q(Q )).(ii) In  
any implementable allocation, higher-type consumers m ust purchase products 
o f weakly higher quality, i.e. i f  6j  >  Qi then q(Qj) > q{Qi)-
P ro o f. See Appendix 3.6.1. ■
The above (standard) result states tha t any implementable allocation, and 
therefore also the equilibrium allocation, must be weakly monotonic: con­
sumers of higher type purchase goods of weakly higher quality.
Given this result, in any implementable allocation, let Qi G [#,#], i =  
1,2, ...,1V, be the ’’marginal” consumer type such tha t all types Q : Qi+\ > 
Q > Qi are allocated quality qi. Clearly, weak monotonicity implies tha t Qj > 
Qi for any j  > i. Notice tha t the vector 0  also pins down the supply vector 
x  =  [xi,X2 , where Xi = F  {Qi+i) — F  (Qi) > 0 is the supply of good of
quality qi. Therefore, quality qi is sold if and only if Qi+i > Qi.
Lemma 3.2 states tha t there is a one-to-one relationship between any im­
plementable quality allocation q(Q) and the vector 0 = [Q\, Q2 , ..., Qn]  of N  
marginal consumers Qi.
Lem m a 3.2 Any implementable quality allocation q (Q) can be described by 
a vector o f marginal consumers 0 — [Q\, Q2 , .., On]* Any vector 0 describes a 
unique weakly monotonic schedule q (Q).
P ro o f. Straightforward given the weak monotonicity of implementable 
allocations and the definition of 0. m
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In order to  get rid of incentive compatibility and rationality constraints 
in the monopolist’s maximisation problem a further step is needed. For any 
quality allocation 0, I identify the optimal implementing price vector p  (0), 
i.e. the price vector that maximises the monopolist’s profits conditional on 
the resulting allocation being implementable.
L em m a 3.3 The price vector p  (0) =  [pi,P2 > • that optimally implements 
quality allocation 0  has element
i
Pi = ^ 2 u (0l,qi) ~ u (6 i ,q i - i)  (3.1)
1=1
P ro o f. See Appendix 3.6.2. ■
Notice tha t expression 3.1 applies also if for some i Qi = 0 ;_ i, i.e. if some 
feasible qualities are not sold by the monopolist.
W ith these results in hand, I can now rewrite and solve the simplified 
optimisation problem of the monopolist. Given the monotonicity property 
of any implementable quality allocation, focusing the search of the optimal 
allocation, within the set of weakly monotonic allocations where Qj >  Qi for 
any j  > i, I can write the profit of the monopolist as the sum of profits from 
each exogenous feasible quality <71, <72, •••, <7 at as follows:
02 03 0
n = J \p{qi )  -  c ( q i ) ] d F( 0 )  +  J \p(q2) -  c (q2)]dF{Q) + ... + j  \p(qN ) ~  c ( q N)]dF(Q)
0\ 02 01V
=  [p (9 1 ) -  C (9 1 )] [F (e2) — F  (0!)] +  -  +  [p M  -  c(qN)][F  ( 8 ) - F  (8N)]
=  £  !p  (*) - c («)1 lF  W+i) -  F  (*>)]
i= l ,  2,..., N
where I define Qn +i =  #•
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I can now substitute the optimal implementing prices
Pi = qi) -  u  (i9i, qi^{)
1 = 1
in the expression for profits and consider the following maximisation problem 
in which the monopolist solves for the optimal vector 6* = [O^ , 6 % ,0 ^ ]  under 
the monotonicity constraints 9j > 9{ for any j  > i:
m axll (0) =
l= l ,2 , . . . ,N  
subject to
^   ^ (u {9m,} qm) U {9mi qm—l)) Q
.771=1
(3.2)
9i — 9j < 0 for any i < j
The Lagrangian of this maximisation problem is
N - 1 N
H $ )  = n ( 0 )  +  £  Y ,  IA'm ( e i - e m)}
1= 1  771= 7 + 1
The Kuhn and Tucker’s necessary conditions for maximisation are:1
7-1  N
E
h = l  h = i + l
(3.3)
d L ( P )  d n ( O ' )  ^
d 0 i  0 6 ,  2 ^  ' » +
(3.4)
* i A ei - ei ) = 0
e • - o } < o
2If |^!jf <  0 for any #i, given that =  0 for any i  j ,  then the Hessian matrix is




In Appendix 3.6.3 I show that
 ^ = ~  [« (#*>«) -  « W >9«-i) -  (ci -  Cj-i)] /(#,*) +  (3.6)
+  [1 - F  (<??)] [««(61 gi) -  ue (81,« _ ,) ]
where cq = 0.
Define:
•  A S  (0,qj,qi) = [u(9,qj) — Cj] — [u (9 ,q i) — c*], i.e. the change in social 
surplus associated to consumption of quality qj rather than quality qi by 
a consumer of type 9 (’’upgrade surplus function”); and
• ASg (9, qj, qi) = -§qAS (9, qj,qi) = [u0 (9, qj) -  ug (9, ©)], i.e. the deriva­
tive of the upgrade surplus function with respect to the consumer-type 
9. Notice tha t ASg  (9, qj,qi) > 0 for any qj > qi because, by assumption, 
[u (0, qj) — u (9, qi)] is increasing in 9 for any qj > qi.
Expression 3.6 can thus be rewritten as
=  - A S  (81, « ,« _ , )  /  (81) +  [1 -  F  (0?)] A Sg (81, « ,« _ , )  (3.7)
3.4 Analysis: cannibalisation and product replace­
ment
In this section I use the theoretical model to study the conditions under which
different feasible product-qualities can coexist in the optimal product line.
This is useful to understand when the introduction of a new product in the
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product line is associated with product proliferation and when it results instead 
in product replacement.
First of all, I discuss if a product can ever have a destructive impact on 
products of higher quality because of cannibalisation considerations. I then 
consider the destructive impact tha t introducing a product in the product line 
may have on lower-quality products: I show tha t product replacement due to 
cannibalisation considerations is a localised phenomenon and I present a nec­
essary and sufficient condition for product replacement (rather than product 
proliferation) to be optimal.
The first question th a t I address is if the introduction of a product can 
ever have a destructive impact on products of higher quality, i.e. if selling the 
high-quality product cannibalises sales of the low-quality product th a t ,may 
be optimal to avoid by not selling the high-quality product. In order to  more 
clearly discuss the relevant economic mechanism, it is useful to focus on the 
simplified case in which the set of feasible qualities includes only two qualities, 
qj and qi with qj > qi.
Proposition 3.4 states that, as long as there are some consumers who prefer 
to purchase the higher-quality good rather than the lower-quality good if both 
were to be sold at prices equal to their respective marginal costs, then it is 
always optimal to sell the good of higher quality alongside the good of lower 
quality (or possibly alone).
P ro p o s itio n  3.4 I f  the monopolist sells quality qi, then selling quality qj, 
qj > qi, is not optimal i f  and only i f  A S  (Q, qj, qi) <  0 for every 0.
P ro o f. If the firm sells only quality qi, to consumers 6 > Qi, it obtains 
profits equal to
7T (Qi) = [1 — F  (0i)] [u (Qi, qi) -  u (Qi, qo) -  Ci\ 
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If the firm sells quality qj alongside quality qi to  all consumer types 9 > 
9j > $i it obtains profits
n(0i ,9j)  = [ 1 - F ( 6 i ) \ [ u ($ i ,q i ) - u (0 i ,q o) -C i]  +
"h [F i@j) ~ F (^*)] iu Qj) ~ u (PjiQi) ~ (cj ~ £*)]
which can be written as
5r (9i, 9j) = tt (Qi) +  [F (i9j) -  F  (9i)} A S  (0jt qj,qi)
To prove sufficiency, notice that, if A S  (9, qj,qCj <  0 for every 0, then there 
is no 9j > 0i such that 7f (0{, 0j) > ir (9i).
To prove necessity, suppose tha t there is a consumer-type 9* such tha t 
A S  (0*, qj , qi) > 0 and th a t A S  (9 , qj , qi) < 0 for every 9 < 9*. Since AS$  (0, qj, qi) > 
0, A S  (9, qj, qi) > 0 for every 0 > 0* . In this case, the firm does better than 
selling only quality qi by selling quality qj to all 9 > 9j  where 0j =  max (0j, 9*).
■
A product of higher quality cannot be optimally sold alongside a product 
of lower quality only if all consumers prefer to purchase the latter rather then 
the former if both were sold at a prices equal to their respective marginal 
costs of production, i.e. there is no consumer who is willing to pay a premium 
for the high quality good th a t is at least as large as the incremental cost of 
production.
Selling quality qj alongside quality qi does not increase overall sales but it 
reduces the sales of quality qi. This cannibalisation, however, is only appar­
ent: when a unit of the high quality good is sold, the consumer is implicitly 
purchasing a unit of the low quality good in addition to an ’’upgrade” . This
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can be seen by considering the firm’s profit function
7T =  [F (0j) -  F  (Oi)} [u (Qi, qi) -  u (Qi, go) -  c j  +
+  [1 -  F  (0j)] [u (9 j,q j) -  u (0j, qi) +  u (<9i, g j  -  u (0*, go) -  cj]
which shows tha t the firm sells quality qj to [1 — F  (9j)] consumers and 
quality qi to [F (9j) — F  (9i)] consumers and by observing tha t it can be rewrit­
ten as
7f =  [1 -  F  (0<)] [u (Qi, qi) -  u ($i , go) -  c*] +
+  lF  (Oj)  -  F  ( ^ ) l  \u  (O j i V j )  -  u  ( O j ’ Qi) -  ( c3 -  ° i ) }
The expression shows tha t the firm can be thought of as selling quality qi 
to [1 — F  (0j)] consumers and the upgrade [qj — g»] (which costs (cj — c*) to 
produce) to [F (6j) — F  (0^)] consumers.2 If no consumer is willing to  pay for
the upgrade a price tha t is at least equal to the cost of the upgrade, then, as
proposition 3.4 shows, it is not optimal to supply the upgrade, i.e. the high 
quality product. Therefore, the reason why it might not be profitable for the 
monopolist to supply a high-quality product alongside the low-quality product 
is tha t consumers do not value the "upgrade" enough to cover the higher cost 
of production of the high-quality good and not the fact th a t the high-quality 
good cannibalises the low-quality good.
In this (standard) vertical differentiation model, it is the low-quality good 
that "cannibalises" the high-quality good in the sense the former constrains 
the price at which the latter can be sold. Product replacement driven by 
cannibalisation considerations therefore has a downward nature: it is the in­
2Johnson and Myatt (2003, 2006) have used this notion of "upgrades" to develop the 
analysis of a Cournot vertical-differentiation oligopoly.
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troduction of a product of higher quality in the product line th a t may cause 
the firm to optimally withdraw products of lower quality from the market in 
order to increase the price at which the (new) high quality good can be sold.
However, in the presence of multiple feasible qualities, it is not clear what 
low-quality products are affected by this potential destructive effect: does 
it affect products a t the bottom of the quality ladder or is it relevant only 
” locally”?
Proposition 3.5 states that product exit stemming from cannibalisation 
considerations has always a localised nature in the sense th a t if qi is not op­
timally sold alongside quality qj, with qj > qi, then no other intermediate 
quality qm ' qi  < qm <  Qj can optimally be sold alongside quality qj.
P ro p o s itio n  3.5 Consider three qualities qj, qm and qi, with qj > qm > Qi • 
IfO] =  G*i, then 0* = e*m .
P ro o f. The statem ent follows directly from the weak monotonicity con­
straint of implementable allocations. If 9j = 9* but 6* > 9 ^  then it would 
follow tha t 9* > 9 ^  which contradicts the requirement tha t 9j >  9* for any 
Qj >  Qi • ■
This result does not depend on any restriction on the utility function and 
the cost function other tha t the standard assumption that consumers of higher 
type value an increase in the quality of the good more than consumers of lower 
type. In fact, it follows directly from the localised nature of the vertical dif­
ferentiation model. However, it has an interesting implication for the study 
of product replacement: proposition 3.5 suggests tha t cannibalisation consid­
erations can explain product replacement, but only in the form of localised 
product upgrading observed in markets such as th a t for cars in which firms 
"upgrade" their products. By contrast, cannibalisation considerations in this
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model do not appear relevant to  explaining product replacement as observed 
in a market like tha t for personal computers, where movements of the frontier 
of technology are associated with the relatively ordered exit of products at the 
bottom  of the quality ladder.
Having determined tha t product replacement driven by cannibalisation 
considerations is a localised phenomenon th a t affects neighbouring qualities, 
the following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for prod­
uct replacement, rather than product proliferation, to be optimal.
P ro p o s itio n  3.6 Consider two qualities qj and qi, with qj >  qi. Quality qi 
cannot be optimally sold alongside quality qj, i.e. 6j =  6*, i f  and only i f
d_ (  A S (d ,q j,q i)  \
DO \A S ( 0 ,q i ,q i - ) )  ~
where qi_ is the highest quality below qi optimally sold by the monopolist.
P ro o f. See Appendix 3.6.4. ■
Proposition 3.6 states th a t selling a product of quality qi alognside a prod­
uct of higher quality qj cannot be optimal if and only if for higher-type con­
sumers the upgrade surplus from quality qi to quality qj is proportionally 
lower than the upgrade surplus from quality to quality qi. In other words, 
product replacement occurs if higher consumer types value the upgrade from 
good qi to good qj proportionally less than the upgrade from qi- to qi when 
all products are sold at prices equal to  their respective marginal costs.
This general result can be applied to specific utility and production func­
tions. I have considered two specific cases th a t are common in the literature: 
the case in which consumers have utility function u  (0, q) =  Oq, and the case 
in which all qualities can be produced at the same marginal cost.
Define A qj =  qj — qi, A qi =  qi — qi_, A Cj — Cj — Ci and Ac* =  Cj — Ci_.
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C o ro lla ry  3 .7  Suppose consumers ’ utility function is u (0, q) =  Qq. Quality
qi cannot be optimally sold alongside quality qj, i.e. 0j = 6*, i f  and only i f
Acj ^  A Cj 
A qj — Aqi'
P ro o f. According to  proposition 3.6, 0j =  0* if and only if As(e,qfql\  *s 
decreasing in 0. If u (#,<?) =  0q, S  (0, qj, qi) = 0Aqj — A  Cj and therefore, a 
necessary and sufficient condition for ^ A S { 9 , q ! q l \ )  -  tha t
A S e ( 0 , q j , q i ) A S ( 0 , q i , q i - ) - A S e ( 0 , q i , q i - ) A S { 0 ,q j , q i )  < 0 ->
A qj [0Aqi — Acj] — Aqi [0Aqj — Acj] < 0 —►
0A qiA q j  —  A q jA c i  — 0A q iA q j  +  A q iA c j  <  0 — >
Aqi Ac  j  — AqjAci  < 0 —*
A cj Aci
—  < -----A qj Aqi
»
Corollary 3.7 implies tha t, when the utility function is linear, product 
replacement occurs when the cost per unit of quality of the upgrade from qi to 
qj is lower than the cost per unit of quality of the upgrade from qi- to qi. This 
result is consistent with the one obtained by Johnson and M yatt (2003) who 
suggest tha t firms sell all feasible qualities if the utility function is u (0, q) = 0q 
and there are decreasing returns to quality, i.e. increasing in i.
C o ro lla ry  3.8 Suppose qualities qj, qi and qi- can all be produced at the same 
marginal cost c. Quality qi cannot be optimally sold alongside quality qj, i.e. 
6) = 61  i f  and only i f  &  ( ^ " ($ ^ )  <  0.
P ro o f. If qj, qi and qi- can all be produced at the same marginal cost
anrl JL (  A u (d \  \  <  H fh p n  A 5 (g»9j.9») _  Au(0,gj ,q i)  <  n  p rnnn<.:t :nnc and d9 J S  U, then AS d^ q.q. ^  — Au(0,gi,gi_) — U' Proposition d.b
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states th a t this is a necessary and sufficient condition for product replacement 
to  occur, i.e. Q*j =  6*. u
When an improvement in quality can be obtained as the result of R&D 
investments w ithout a significant impact on the cost of production (e.g. soft­
ware), the results obtained suggest tha t product replacement takes place when 
consumers of higher type value the quality upgrade proportionally less than 
low type consumers.
Proposition 3.6 is also useful to explain the extreme result obtained by 
Siebert (2003), according to which product replacement is always optimal. In 
fact, Siebert considers a model in which consumers have a linear utility func­
tion and all qualities can be produced at the same marginal cost. The combi­
nation of these assumptions implies tha t q =  ^ an<^  P r o P o s i f i ° n
3.6 suggests th a t in this case product proliferation cannot be optimal.
3.5 Conclusions
In this Chapter I have presented a model of vertical differentiation to study 
the impact th a t product innovation has on the survival of other products in 
a firm’s product line because of cannibalisation considerations. In general, a 
(new) better product may coexist with other products sold by the firm (prod­
uct proliferation) or may not (product replacement). The analysis presented in 
this Chapter suggests that, in a vertically-differentiated environment, product 
replacement stemming from cannibalisation considerations affects the survival 
of products of lower quality and tha t it has a localised nature, i.e. it takes the 
form of "product upgrading" whereby the new product replaces neighbouring 
products in the quality ladder. I have derived a necessary and sufficient condi­
tion for product innovation to  be associated with product proliferation rather 
than  with product replacement and I have considered how this condition ap­
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plies to some common parametric specifications of the vertical differentiation 
model.
The analysis can be extended in various directions. In particular, it might 
be interesting to study how endogenous product replacement or product pro­
liferation affects the incentives of a multiproduct monopolist to invest in in­
novation, especially in a dynamic perspective in which the firm anticipates 
the impact of its future innovative activity on the profitability of the products 
tha t it develops.
3.6 A ppendix to  Chapter 3
3 .6 .1  P r o o f  o f  c la im  3 .1
P ro o f, (i) Suppose tha t for two different consumer types Qi ^  Qj the al­
location is such th a t q(Qi) =  q{0j) but p(9i) > p ( 9 j )■ In this case, a 
type Qi consumer would enjoy a higher utility by reporting Qj and consum­
ing (q (Qj) = Q (Qi) ,P(Qj)), i-e- it would not have the incentive to  truthfully 
report its true type. The allocation considered cannot therefore be truthfully 
implemented since the incentive compatibility constraint would be violated.
(ii) I will prove this claim by contradiction. Consider an allocation such 
tha t a consumer of type Qi purchases product qi a t price pi and a consumer 
of type Qj > Qi purchases product qj at price pj with qj < qi, i.e. the higher 
type consumes a product of lower quality.
If the proposed allocation were implementable it would have to be incentive 
compatible, i.e. a consumer of type Qi would have to derive more utility from 
purchasing product (qi,Pi) rather than product (qj,P j):
u  (Qi, qi)  -  Pi >  u  (Qi, q j )  -  p j
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which can be written as
« {Qi, Qi) ~ u {Qi, Qj) >Pi- Pj (3.8)
Similarly, implementability requires tha t a consumer of type 9j must derive 
higher utility from purchasing product (q j,p j) rather than product (g*,p*):
u (Oj,Qj) ~Pj>u {Qj,Qi) ~ Pi
which can be written as
Pi ~ P j > u  (6j, qi) -  u  (6 j, qj) (3.9)
Expressions (1) and (2) imply tha t the given allocation is implementable 
only if
« (Qi, Qi) - u {®i, Qj) > u {Qj, Qi) ~ u {Qj,Qj)
However, this contradicts the assumption whereby u (6 , q') — u (Q, q) is in­
creasing in 9 when q' > q. The proposed allocation cannot therefore be tru th ­
fully implemented. ■
3 .6 .2  P r o o f  o f  c la im  3 .3
P ro o f. A price vector p  optimally implements the quality allocation described
by the vector 0  if the resulting allocation satisfies all incentive compatibility
and rationality constraints and if the monopolist achieves the highest profitsi
from quality allocation 0 . The proof shows th a t only prices pi = ^  u  (9i, qi) —
1 = 1
u (9 i,q i-1) satisfy these requirements.
I prove the statement by induction. Consider the lowest quality offered by
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the monopolist q\. By definition, 9\ >  0 is the consumer type such th a t all 
consumers Q>Q\ purchase a good of quality q\ or higher.
If the monopolist charges a price p*  higher than  p\ = u (9 \,q i)  — u  (#1 , go) 
the quality allocation described by the vector 0  cannot be implemented since 
all consumers 9 f  < 9  < 9 \  where 9* solves p f  = — u (9~l, go) would
be better off by purchasing the outside option go rather than good of quality
On the other hand, it would not be optimal for the monopolist to charge
a lower price since by increasing the price up to p\ = u {9\, q\) — u (^i, go), he
could still implement the quality allocation 0 and obtain higher profits
Similarly, consider now the second lowest quality q^. In an implementable
allocation in which consumers of type 9, 9 > #2 , purchase good of quality g2 or
2
higher, the monopolist cannot charge a price higher than p 2  — u (9i,qi) —
i=i
u (91 , q i-i). If it did so, some consumers 9 > 9 2 would be better off purchasing
good of quality q\ at price p\. On the other hand, the monopolist has no
2
incentive to charge a price lower than P2  = u  (9i,qi) — u (9i, q i-i)  since it
1 = 1
could increase profits by charging this price, the resulting allocation still being 
implementable.
The same argument can be repeated for all the other feasible qualities. ■
3 .6 .3  D er iv a tio n  o f  ex p r e ss io n  3 .6
Consider the profit function:
n(fl)= £
1=1,2,—,N
^   ^ (u {9 rm  Qrri) 'U 'iPm iQ m — l ) )  Q
jm = 1
Notice tha t this can be re-written as




Consider the partial derivative with respect to 9i and let cq =  0 to  obtain
-  [u (Oi, qi) -  u  (6 i , q i - 1)] /  (O i) + [ u e (Oi, qi) -  u e (9it gj_i)] [1 -  F  ( 9 i ) ] + ( c i  -  c*_i) /  (6i)
This can be rearranged to obtain expression 3.6:
-  [u (Qi, Qi) ~  U (Qi, q i - i )  -  (Ci -  C i - 1 )] /  ( Q i ) + [u e (&i, qi) -  ue  (Qi, ^ - i ) ]  [1 - F  (0/)]
3 .6 .4  P r o o f  o f  p r o p o s it io n  3 .6
The proof of proposition 3.6 is rather involved and derives from the combina­
tion of a number of individual results.
L em m a 3.9 (i) Selling quality qi is optimal i f  and only i f  X*j = 0 fo r all 
j  > i. Selling quality qi is not optimal i f  and only i f  X*j < 0 fo r  at least a 
j  > i. (ii) i f K j  < 0, then X ^j < 0 fo r every m  : i < m  < j .
P ro o f, (i) Quality qi is optimally sold if and only if 9j > 9* for every j  > i. 
Complementary slackness requires tha t X*j = 0 for every j  > i. Similarly, 
quality qi is not optimally sold if 9* = 9* for at least a j  > i. Complementary 
slackness requires tha t X*j < 0 for at least a j  > i.
(ii) If <  0 then 9* = 9j.  Suppose there exists a quality qm '• qi < q-m < qj 
such that X ^j = 0. This implies th a t 9j > 9 ^ .  But, since 9* = 9*j, this would 
also imply th a t >  9*m which violates the monotonicity constraint th a t must 
hold in any implementable allocation. ■
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L em m a 3.10 (i) I f  quality qi is optimally sold, then ^  9Uqq  ^ = 0 .  (ii) I f
1=1 1
quality qi is not optimally sold, then ^   ^ > 0
i=i 1
P ro o f. Consider the sum of the set of first-order-conditions for all qualities 
less or equal than qi and notice tha t at the optimum
z=i * j=1 Z=i+1
(i) If quality qi is optimally sold, then lemma 3.9 states th a t A = 0 for alli
I > j .  Therefore ^  =  0. (ii) If quality qi is not optimally sold, then
1=1 1
lemma 3.9 states th a t it must be the case tha t Xjt <  0 for a t least one I : I > j .i
Therefore, in this case >  0. ■
i=i 1
Lem m a 3.11 -  (- )0 i f a n d  o n l y  i f  ^
P ro o f. Consider the derivative
O f  A S  (9, qj, qi) \  < Q
09 \ A S { 6 ,q i , q i_)
&Se (A, qj, Qi) & S  (9, qj, qj_) -  A S0 (9, qj, qj._) A S  (9, qj, qf)
[A S(0,* ,ft_)]2
i.e.
A Sq (i9, qj, qi) A S  (9, qi, ^ _ )  -  ASq (9, q{, ®_) A S  (9, qj,qf) < 0
i.e.
A S  {9, qj, qi) > AS{9 ,q i ,q i - )  1
A S0 {9,qj,qi) A  S0 (9,qi,qi-)
since by assumption ASg  (9,qi,qi_) >  0. ■
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L em m a 3.12 (Sufficient co n d itio n  for c re a tiv e  d e s tru c tio n )  If, fo r every 
consumer type 9,
AS(6,qj ,qi) >  AS(9,qi,qi_)
&So (9, qj, g*) AS# (0, g*, g*_)
i/ien 9j = 9\
P ro o f. I will show tha t quality qi can be optimally sold alongside quality 
qj, i.e. 9j > 9*, only if
A S(9*,qj ,qi) ^  A S ( 9 ^ q i l qi- )
&S& Qj, Qi) AS* W , Qi, Qi-) 
Therefore, if for every 9
A S(9,qj ,qi)  > AS (9 ,q i ,q i - )
A Se(9 ,q j,q i) A S e (9,qi,qiJ)
then it thus must be the case tha t quality qi cannot be optimally sold alongside 
quality qj, i.e. 9j = 9*.
If 9j > 9*, quality qi can be optimally sold alongside quality qj. If both 
quality qj and quality qi are optimally sold, then lemma 3.10 states th a t the 
following conditions must be satisfied
E^P=° <^ >i=i 1
and
i=i 1
By substracting expression 3.12 from expression 3.11 one obtains
( 3 ,3 )
I—4+1
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Let 0* the vector of marginal consumers such tha t 9j = 0* for every j  > i. 
Notice tha t
£  mp- = ~AS w +AS» ® > * )  [ ! - f  (**)]
If <  0 for every i, so th a t Kuhn and Tucker’s necessary conditions for 
a maximum are also sufficient, it must be the case tha t
V  EiiAZiZ > V " ) (3.14)
,Z-> dOi ^  dQi K }l=i+1 ‘ l=i+1 ‘
3
By combining expressions 3.13 and 3.14 one obtains tha t Y  dd ^
i= i+ l 1
i.e.
- A S  (91 qj,qi) f  (0*) + A S e {91 qh  f t) [ 1 - F  (0?)] >  0 
1 - f  (<??). A S V lg j ,® )
/(0J)  ^AS, (»?.©.«)
Consider now quality g i-, which is defined as the highest quality below qi 
optimally sold by the monopolist. If quality is optimally sold, lemma 3.10 
states that the following condition must be satisfied
v an(f l*)  n
Z ^  /M,
1 = 1
d9t
and therefore, given condition 3.12, it must be the case tha t
Z ^  d9i
!=(<-)+1 1
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Since no quality in between qi and qi- is optimally sold, and therefore 9m =  9\ 
for any i > m >  (i—) it follows tha t tha t
e  m p - = ~ a s  w . « . « - )  f  w ) + a s » (« '.»>  * - )  [ i - ' p  («*)]
Z = (t- )+ l 1
This expression if equal to  zero iff 
1 - F ( & t)  A (3.16)
By combining expressions 3.15 and 3.16 it follows th a t a necessary condi­
tion for Oj > 6* is tha t
A S  (0*, qj,qi) < A S  (9*,qii qi~)
A S q (9*i ,qj,qi) A S e (9-, q{, q{- )
Therefore, if for every 9
A S ( 9 1qj l qi) > A S(9 ,q i ,q i - )
A S e (9,qj,qi) A
then 9*j =9*,  i.e. selling quality qi alongside quality qj cannot not optimal. ■
L em m a 3.13 (N ecessary  c o n d itio n  for c rea tiv e  d e s tru c tio n )  If9*j = 9* 
then
A S  (9, qj,qi) > A S ( 9 1qi l qi- )
ASe (&, qj-, qi) ASe(9,qi,qi-)
P ro o f. I will show that, if for every consumer type 9
A S  (9, qj, qi) < A S ( 9 , q iyqi-)
A S 0 (0, qj, qi) A S e (9, qit q,>_)
then 9* > 9*.
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Suppose th a t 9j = 9*. In this case, lemma 3.10 states tha t the following 





dOii ^ > «
1 = 1
These two expressions imply tha t
Z=i+1 1
According to proposition 3.5, if 0*j =9*,  then 9j = 9* = 0 ^  for every m  : j  > 
m  > i and therefore
e  m p ~ = ~ a s  ^ f  w ) + A se  {e*’ ^ qi) [i ~ p  w ) il=i+1 1
For this expression to be negative it must be the case th a t
l - f ( g ? )  .  A S ( 9 l qj, qi)
/(0 ? )  A SB( e i qj, q t  y ■ ’
Consider now g^_, which is the highest quality below qi sold in the mar­
ket. If quality qi_ is optimally sold, then it is necessary tha t ^2 =  0.i=i 1
Therefore it must be the case tha t
t  T > 0l=(i-)+i 1
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because
^  an (a*) an (g*) ^  an (r )
i=(t ^ +i ~ h  m  h  901
where E ^  =  0 and E ^ > 0 .
/=i z=i
Since no quality between qi and qi- is sold by definition of qi-, 9 ^  = 9\
for every i > m >  (i—) and therefore
i z  =  ~ A S  ( « * .* .« - )  /  («*) +  A S g  ( 0 : ,« ,« _ )  [1 -  F  (6>|)]
!=(<-)+! *
The condition ^   ^ >  0 thus implies tha t
J=(i-)+i 1
l - ^ W )  .
/ (6 ? )  ^ A  Se { 9 U i,q i- )  K ' '
Expression 3.17 and expression 3.18 together imply tha t a necessary condition 
for 9j = 9* is that
A S ( 9 l qj, qi) > A S(9*,qi ,qi-)
A S e ( 9 l q j , q i )  A S e { 9 * , q i , q i - )
Therefore, if for every 9
AS{9,qj,qi) < AS{9,qi,qi-)
A Se(9,qj,qi) A S e {9,qi,qi-)
then it must be the case 9j >9*. 
This implies that 9*~ =  9* only if
A S(9,qj ,qi)  >  A S(9 ,q i ,q i - )
A S q (9, qj, qi) A S0 {9, qi, qi-)
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Proposition 3 follows from the combination of lemma 3.11, lemma 3.12 and 
lemma 3.13.
Lemma 3.12 states th a t if
A S >  A S  ( # ,% ,$ - )
ASo (0, qj, qi) ~  A S e (0, qit g*_)
then 6j = 9*.
Lemma 3.11 states t h a t ^ ^ g  > and only if £ £ $ % £ !)
is (weakly) decreasing in 9.  Therefore, if ^s(9,qf 'q l\  *s (weakly) decreasing in 
6 then 9j =  6* .
Similarly, lemma 3.13 states that if 9j = 9* then
A S ( 9 , q j y qi) >  A S  
A S 0 ( 9 , q j , q i )  ~  A S g ( 9 , q i , q i _ )
Combining this result with lemma 3.11 it follows that if 9 j  = 9* then 
is (weakly) decreasing in 9.
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Chapter 4
Optimal product line, 
secondary trading and used  
goods
4.1 Introduction
Second-hand trade is an im portant feature of many markets for durable goods. 
The organisation of secondary trading varies considerably, from relatively un­
structured peer-to-peer transactions to developed markets in which a range of 
intermediaries purchase and resell used goods, match buyers and sellers, and 
often provide associated services such as quality certification and warranties.
A striking feature of many second-hand markets is tha t manufacturers of 
durable goods often act as intermediaries in the exchange of used goods. For 
instance, IBM was selling used IBM typewriters in the 60s and since 1987 it 
has been reselling used IT equipment, such as mainframes, midrange systems
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and PC servers.1 O ther manufacturers in IT  industries, such as Compaq, Dell, 
Hewlett Packard, Cisco and SUN have recently started to offer trade-in pro­
motions and to resell used equipment, which they usually refurbish and often 
adapt to  the specific needs of customers. Often, the products th a t are resold 
by these manufacturers are acquired from patrons who traded in their used 
equipment in order to purchase a new one.2 In the market for aircraft, Boeing 
has been selling even used Airbuses. Most car manufacturers sell certified pre­
owned vehicles to which they extend warranty coverage, which now account 
for one third of used cars tha t are exchanged in the US.
In this paper I discuss a possible explanation of this commonly observed 
strategy of durable goods manufacturers. The main idea I put forward is 
that, by directly acting as an intermediary in the market for used good and 
by internalising the transaction costs of secondary trading, the manufacturer 
can induce former customers to upgrade while selling the new good to  new 
consumers at the highest possible price.3
The model tha t I discuss in this Chapter describes a market for a per­
fectly durable good subject to quality-improving technological change, which 
is analysed over a two-period horizon. .Each period, a new cohort of heteroge­
neous consumers enters the market. Consumers in each cohort differ in their 
willingness to pay for quality. In addition, in period 2 an additional source 
of heterogeneity arises because consumers with the same willingness to pay
1 Howevcer, notice that in the market for personal computers that I studied in Chapter 1 
and in Chapter 2 sales of used goods by PC manufacturers is not a common phenomenon.
2 In some cases, when a product under warranty is in need of service, manufacturers prefer 
to replace the product with a new one altogether. The products acquired are often refur­
bished and (re)sold at discounted prices. This phenomenon is different and complementary 
to the one that I investigate in this Chapter, which is related to consumers upgrading to new 
better durable goods and not to consumers requesting assistance for faulty products.
3Notice that I use the term "transaction costs" to indicate the costs that must be borne 
in order for a used good to be exchanged. This usage is consistent with the literature on 
secondary trading that I review in the next section.
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for quality may have different purchase histories: some consumers have just 
entered the market while other consumers may hold a durable good purchased 
in period 1.
In period 2, the manufacturer may find it profitable to sell the new tech­
nology to consumers in both cohorts, i.e. to consumers with different purchase 
histories, but its ability of doing so depends on the nature of the good. For 
some durable goods such as software, which I term  ’’knowledge-based” , the 
manufacturer can profitably sell an "upgrade" to former consumers because 
consumers value the upgrade more than its cost. In this case, the manufacturer 
can optimally offer a trade-in promotion to discriminate between consumers 
with a different purchase history and charge former consumers a price tha t 
reflects only the incremental utility tha t they would enjoy from purchasing 
the new technology while charging new consumers the full price.4
In other industries, which I term  ’’industrial” , however, the manufacturer 
cannot profitably sell the new good to old consumers if a secondary market 
does not exist because former consumers value the upgrade to the new tech­
nology less than its cost.
The fact that used goods are traded has two effects on the market for the 
new technology. Used goods are a substitute for new goods and hence tend 
to decrease the price at which the new technology can be sold. At the same 
time, however, second-hand trade allows former patrons to upgrade to the new 
technology or, in general, to upgrade more frequently.
Secondary trading often entails possibly significant transaction costs de­
riving, for instance, from the effort required to  match buyers and sellers or 
from the provision of quality certification to address problems of asymmetric
4 Buy-back strategies have also been studied by Levinthal and Purhoit (1989), Lee and 
Lee (1998) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1998).
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information.
The existence of transaction costs implies th a t the price at which the new 
good can be sold to former patrons is lower than  the price a t which the new 
good can be sold to new consumers. In fact, former patrons choose between 
buying the new good and keeping the one in their possession, which entails 
an implicit cost equal to the price at which the used good can be sold in the 
secondary market. However, new consumers choose instead between buying 
the new good and buying a used good at the market price which is higher than 
the  price at which the used good can be sold by former consumers. If there is 
a competitive market for used goods, in fact, the difference between the price 
a t which a used good can be sold and the price at which it can be purchased 
by consumers is equal to the transaction cost th a t are borne when trading a 
used good. Transaction costs therefore drive a wedge between the price th a t 
new and former consumers are willing to pay for the new technology. As a 
result, if the manufacturer wants to sell the new technology to both groups of 
consumers, it is constrained by the lower price th a t former patrons would be 
willing to pay for the new technology, given the price tha t they can obtain for 
their used good.
This suggests tha t there is scope for the manufacturer to improve profits by 
offering a trade-in promotion and internalising transaction costs. A trade-in 
promotion allows the manufacturer to  sell the new technology to both former 
patrons and to new consumers at the highest price possible. This is because, 
rather than allowing former consumers to upgrade by lowering the price at 
which the new good is sold, the monopolist allows them to upgrade by pur­
chasing their used goods at a higher price than the one offered by competitive 
traders. This strategy does not affect the profitability of a transaction with 
former consumers who upgrade to  the new technology: what the monopolist
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gives with one hand it takes with the other. However, charging a high price 
for the new good increases the profits from sales to new consumers.
This is not to say tha t the existence of a secondary market always increases 
the profits of the monopolist. In fact, the monopolist may be better off by 
simply selling the new durable good to new consumers at a high price. How­
ever, when a secondary market exists, the monopolist is better off by directly 
trading used goods and internalising transaction costs..
In the remainder of this Chapter I first discuss the related literature. In 
section 4.3, I present the model and the analysis of the equilibrium. Final 
conclusions follow.
4.2 Related literature
Two main strands of the literature on durable goods are closely related to  
this study. The first addresses the long-standing question of what impact the 
existence of an active second-hand market has on the profitability of a monop­
olist seller in the primary market. The second focuses specifically on pricing 
and product-line decisions of a monopolist who sells successive technological 
generations of a durable good and considers the optimality of trade-ins and 
buy-backs.
The impact that the existence of a second-hand market has on a monopo­
list seller has been one of the major questions posed in the economic literature 
on durable goods. Swan (1970, 1972, 1980) suggested th a t the existence of a 
second-hand market does not constrain the profits of the monopolist in the 
primary market: the seller can charge a price tha t reflects the net present 
value of the stream of services provided by the durable good to possibly a 
number of future owners. This striking result hinges on a number of restrictive 
assumptions, and most notably consumers homogeneity and perfect susbsti-
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tutability of the service flow provided by durable goods of different vintages. 
It is not surprising tha t in richer settings, Swan’s result does not hold and 
tha t second-hand trade affects the profitability of the monopolist seller in the 
primary market.
There are various effects at stake, however, and their balance is not clear. 
On the one hand, used goods are a substitute for new goods, which tends 
to decrease the profitability of the monopolist seller. On the other hand, 
consumers may upgrade (more often) to new goods if they are able to sell their 
used goods and would be willing to pay more for goods th a t would command 
a higher resale price. These ideas have been rigorously developed in models 
where consumers are heterogeneous and durable goods are subject to physical 
quality deterioration or technological progress.
Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994) consider a model with heterogeneous con­
sumers, quality depreciation and positive transaction costs in the second-hand 
market. They suggest tha t existence of a smooth second-hand market may 
increase the price at which the new good can be sold since consumers are able 
to anticipate a higher resale value and the monopolist may benefit from it 
because it achieves an indirect form of indirect price discrimination between 
consumers with different willingness to pay for quality. Anderson and Gins­
burgh show that, in any equilibrium where there is an active secondary market 
with a positive price for the used good, the monopolist’s profits are decreasing 
in the level of transaction costs. Nevertheless, the manufacturer may be bet­
ter off if the second-hand market does not exist. This is a global optimum for 
the manufacturer when individuals place a high value on newness because the 
monopolist would benefit little from the increase in demand th a t arises due to  
consumers benefiting from resale value. Like Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994), 
I also consider a model with transaction costs in the second-hand market.
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However, I do not focus on the effect tha t transaction costs have on profits 
because of consumers being able to anticipate a higher resale value, but on 
the effect th a t transaction costs have on the monopolists’ profits from selling 
the new generation of the durable good to  consumers with different purchase 
histories, and I explain why it may be profitable for the monopolist to actu­
ally internalise transaction costs. Unlike Anderson and Ginsburgh, in fact, I 
study the benefits and the costs of reducing transaction costs in the secondary 
market.
Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) consider a model similar to  Anderson and Gins- 
burgh’s and focus on the ability tha t a manufacturer has to  affect the product’s 
durability. They consider only the case of frictionless exchange of used goods 
and argue th a t the existence of a second-hand market would never hurt the 
manufacturer. The explanation of this result relies on the notion th a t the 
monopolist would be able to  achieve a form of indirect price discrimination 
through the second-hand market. Hendel and Lizzeri generalise the paper by 
Waldman (1996) who argues tha t the monopolist may want to eliminate the 
existence of the second-hand market by using leasing. Waldman had consid­
ered the special case where there are only two types of consumers and the 
monopolist could not profitably sell to those consumers with lower willingness 
to pay for quality.
Porter and Sattler (1999) consider a similar model with heterogeneous con­
sumers and product depreciation, which is applied to the study of patterns of 
trade in second-hand markets. Unlike Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) they consider 
also the case in which there are transaction costs in the second-hand market. 
Their main conclusion is th a t durable goods th a t depreciates relatively quickly 
have steeper price declines, but higher volumes of trade.
Kumar (2002) considers a model in which a durable good monopolist
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strategically chooses both the price and the quality of a durable good over 
time and shows tha t the monopolist exploits resale trading by consumers to 
intertemporally price discriminate by strategically controlling the rate of tech­
nological obsolescence.
The main difference between this paper and these studies is tha t I consider 
second-hand markets in a setting where there is technological change rather 
than quality depreciation and tha t I explicitly consider the possibility tha t 
the manufacturer discriminates between consumers w ith different purchase 
histories. Moreover, this paper considers subperfect game equilibria and not 
only the case where the monopolist commits to  a path of prices/output.
These features make this study close to another strand of the literature 
which considers the issue of pricing and product-line decisions in durable goods 
markets subject to technological progress. These models discuss the relation­
ship between static quality discrimination and intertemporal discrimination 
and the profitability of trade-in and buy-back strategies. Unlike this study, 
however, they do not emphasise the role of second-hand markets in making 
upgrading possible and normally consider the case of a frictionless secondary 
market (or no secondary market at all).
Levinthal and Purhoit (1989) consider a two-period model of a durable- 
good monopolist who can produce a good of higher quality in the second 
period. They consider linear demand, no production costs and a frictionless 
second-hand market. They discuss the profitability of a buy-back strategy by 
which the monopolist kills off the second-hand market.
Lee and Lee (1998) consider a two-period model of endogenous technologi­
cal change in a durable good market where there are discrete consumers’ types 
and no second-hand market (i.e. consumer scrap the used good in their pos­
session to  buy new). They study the profitability of an upgrade policy when
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the monopolist discriminates both between consumers with different purchase 
histories and between consumers of different types.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) consider the relationship between intertem­
poral price discrimination and static quality discrimination in a model similar 
to Lee and Lee’s. Unlike Lee and Lee, however, they consider exogenous tech­
nological change, a continuous distribution of consumer types, and both the 
case of a frictionless second-hand market and of no secondary trading.
I study a model with a structure similar to Lee and Lee’s and Fudenberg 
and Tirole’s but, like Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994), I consider transaction 
costs and I propose a new explanation for the role of trade-in promotions.
4.3 The model
Time is discrete and there are only two periods, t  =  1 ,2.5 Each period, a new 
cohort of consumers of mass 2nt enters the market. In each cohort there are 
two groups of consumers with different willingness to pay for quality 9h ,@l , 
with 6h  > Ol , each of mass nt. Each consumer purchases at most one unit 
of the good at any date and a consumer of type 0 who' consumes a good of 
quality V  obtains a per-period utility equal to  u (0, V ) = OV.
In period 1, the monopolist produces a perfectly durable good of quality 
V\ at constant marginal cost c\. In period 2, the monopolist can sell a new 
generation of the good of quality V2 , with V2  > V\, which is produced at 
marginal cost C2 . I assume tha t the cost of ’’upgrading” a good of quality Vi 
to quality V2  is the same as the cost of producing the good from scratch, i.e. 
C2 . I also assume tha t OiYt < ct, t = 1,2, i.e. a new durable good can never 
be profitably sold to Ol consumers and tha t 0 hV 2  — C2  > OhV\ — c\ so tha t
5 This two-period setup is similar to the one used by Fudenberg and Tirole (1998).
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selling technology V2 is more profitable than selling technology V\.
If Oh  consumers purchase good V\ in period 1, there is an opportunity for 
second-hand trade in period 2, since the used good can be potentially sold to 
Ol consumers.
I assume that used goods cannot be exchanged by consumers without the 
intervention of a trader, who incurs the transaction cost r  for each unit ex­
changed.6 The market for trading used goods is perfectly competitive and 
hence traders are price-takers. The monopolist can also intervene in the 
second-hand market by purchasing used goods and reselling them, or by ac­
quiring used goods and disposing of them. I denote by p^u the price at which 
used goods are bought by competitive traders and by psu the price at which 
used goods are sold to  consumers. I denote by p^  the price at which used 
goods are purchased by the monopolist. This price can potentially be differ­
ent from pbu because the monopolist is not subject to  the zero-profit condition 
that must hold for the perfectly competitive traders.
In the analysis, I distinguish between two categories of goods: ’’industrial” 
goods and ’’knowledge-based” goods. The definition is based on the com­
parison between the value of the upgrade (V2 — Vi) to $h  consumer and the 
marginal cost of the new good (which is equal to the marginal cost of the up­
grade). An industrial good is defined as a good for which Oh (V2  — Vi) <  c2, 
i.e. Oh consumers value the upgrade less than its marginal cost. This im­
plies tha t in any equilibrium in which consumers who bought technology Vi 
upgrade to technology V2 a secondary market must be active because the man­
ufacturer cannot profitably sell them an upgrade if the good is not resold to
6 Notice that the model is equivalent to one in which used goods are exchanged directly 
by consumers and in which the buyer must pay cost r  on top of the amount given to the 
seller. The key assumption is that there is a wedge between the price received by a seller 
and the price paid by a buyer when a used good is exchanged.
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Ol consumers. This feature may depict well markets for im portant durable 
goods such as cars and some expensive IT equipment.
A knowledge-based good is instead defined as one for which Ojj (V2  — V\) > 
C2 , i.e. Oh consumers value the upgrade more than the marginal cost of the 
new good, i.e. the marginal cost of the upgrade. In this case, upgrading can 
occur even if there is no active secondary market and I will show th a t, in fact, 
the monopolist may have the incentive to kill-off secondary trading. Software 
and text-books are good examples of knowledge-based goods.
4.4 Analysis
Since I am interested in studying the intervention of the manufacturer in the 
secondary market, I will focus the analysis on period 2, assuming th a t in the 
first period the monopolist had sold technology V\ to n\ consumers of type 
Oh  and therefore tha t a secondary market can indeed be potentially active in 
period 2.
Since, by assumption, selling technology V2  is more profitable than selling 
technology V\ and since since the monopolist cannot profitably sell (new) 
technology V\ to Ol consumers, the monopolist does not optimally produce 
technology V\ in period 2. In period 2, therefore, the manufacturer sells only 
new durable goods of quality V2 , either to new Oh consumers in cohort 2 only 
or to  Oh consumers in both cohort 1 and cohort 2.
I first analyse the case in which the monopolist sells to  both cohorts of 
consumers, i.e. the equilibrium with upgrading, and then the case in which 
the monopolist sells V2  to  consumers in cohort 2 only, i.e. the equilibrium 
with no upgrading. I determine optimum profits within each regime and then 
compare the two regimes to determine the global optimum for the monopolist.
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4.4.1 Equilibrium with upgrading
In this section I consider the case in which the new durable good V2  is sold to  
consumers in both cohorts. I first consider the case in which the monopolist 
sells the new durable good of quality V2  to  consumers in both cohorts and the 
second-hand market is active. An active second-hand market is a necessary 
condition for the new technology V2  to  be profitably sold to Oh consumers in 
cohort 1 in the case of an industrial good. This is because a consumer who 
purchased V\ in period 1 is willing to pay only 0#  (V2  — Vi) to  purchase good 
V2 , but in the case of an industrial good this is lower than the marginal cost 
of purchasing the ’’upgrade” , i.e. Ojj (V2  — Vi) < C2 . I will then consider the 
case in which the monopolist sells a knowledge-based good to consumers in 
both cohorts even if there is not active secondary market.
In any equilibrium in which the new technology is purchased both by con­
sumers in cohort 2 and by consumers in cohort 1 and there is an active sec­
ondary market two incentive constraints must be satisfied.
A Oh consumer in cohort 2 would purchase technology V2  only if the utility 
he would get by doing is at least equal to the utility he would obtain by 
purchasing a used good V\ at price psu:
OhV2 ~ P 2 >  @hV1 — Psu
which can be rewritten as
P2 <  (V2 — Vi) +  Psu (4.1)
Consumers Oh  in cohort 1 would instead purchase good V2 only if upgrad-
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ing yields a higher utility than than keeping the old technology Vi:
OhV\2 ~ P 2  +  ma^{pluiPbu} > QhVx
where p ^  and p ^  are the prices at which a consumer in cohort 1 can sell his 
used good to a competitive trader and to the monopolist respectively. This 
constraint can be rewritten as
P2 < 0H {V2  -  Vi) 4- max {p^P bu}  (4.2)
If there are no transaction costs in the competitive second-hand market, the 
two constraints coincide since the price at which the used good is purchased 
by traders would be equal to the price at which the used good is resold to 
consumers. However, the existence of transaction costs drives a wedge between 
the price at which used goods are purchased by competitive traders p^  and 
the price at which used goods are sold to consumers psu. In turn, this drives 
a wedge between the highest price at which the new good can be sold to new 
consumers and the highest price at which the new good can be sold to former 
patrons.- This can be seen by collapsing constraint 4.1 and constraint 4.2 into 
the following expression:
P2 < Oh  (V2 -  Vi) +  min {p^ , max {p^P bu}}
which shows th a t the highest price a t which the new good can be sold when 
there is an active secondary market is constrained by the minimum between 
the price at which used goods are purchased and the price at which they are 
sold. Notice that, for any p ^  and p ^ ,  it is optimal for the manufacturer to
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set p 2  as large as possible, i.e.
P2 =  Oh  (V2 -  Vi) +  min {psu, max {p^P bu}}
The following proposition states that, in any equilibrium in which the sec­
ondary market is active, it is always profitable for the monopolist to intervene 
directly in the exchange of used goods and to internalise transaction costs.
P ro p o s itio n  4.1 In  any equilibrium in which the monopolist sells the new 
technology to Oh  consumers in both cohorts and there is an active secondary 
market, it is optimal fo r the monopolist to intervene directly in the secondary 
market and to purchase used goods at price p^  =  Ol V i.e. to internalise 
transaction costs.
P ro o f. First of all, notice that, in any equilibrium in which Oh  consumers 
in both cohorts purchase the new durable good in period 2, because of the 
assumption of perfect competition, the highest price tha t a competitive trader 
can offer to purchase a used good is p^u = Ol Vi — r  and the highest price at 
which it would sell the good is p^  = Ol Vi .
I will now consider two possible pricing strategies by the monopolist: (i) 
Pbu <  (Ol V\ — t ) ,  (ii) pjy >  Ol Vi — t .  In strategy (i) the monopolist offers a 
price to purchase used goods which is equal or lower than the price offered by 
competitive traders. In strategy (ii) the monopolist purchases used goods at 
a price higher than the price offered by competitive traders. I will show tha t 
strategy (ii) is more profitable than strategy (i) and, more specifically, tha t 
it is optimal for the monopolist to set p^  =  Ol Vi , i.e. internalise transaction 
costs r .
(i) If the monopolist offers price p^  <  {Ol V\ — r) , the price th a t a con­
sumer in cohort 1 would receive for her used good is (Ol Vi — r ) .  In this case,
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the highest price tha t the manufacturer can charge for the new good and sell 
it to consumers in both cohorts is
P2 = Oh  ( V 2 — V { )  +  (O^Vi — t )
because the incentive constraint for consumers in cohort 1 is binding. This 
results in period-2 profits equal to
n 2 =  (n 1 +  n 2) [0H (V2 -  Vi) +  (0LV1 -  r) -  c2] (4.3)
(ii) If the monopolist sets price p^  =  pj^ > Ol Vi — r ,  competitive traders 
would not be active and the monopolist would manage all secondary trading. 
In this case the monopolist’s period-2 profits would be
f i2 =  (ni +  „2) [ 0 „  (V 2 -  Vi) +  min(p^, 0 L V O  -  c2] +  n , {0L V X -  &  -  r]
The monopolist would sell the new durable good to (n \ +  n2) Oh  consumer 
at price [Oh  (V2 — Vi) +  min(pju, Ol Vi )] and it would trade n\ used goods pur­
chased at price p^  and sold at price Ol V\ incurring the cost r  for each used 
good traded.
Notice tha t is optimal for the monopolist to purchase used goods at price 
p^  =  Ol Vi. Notice in fact, th a t for any p^  >  Ol Vi , ^ ^ I I 2 =  — n \ <  0 and 
tha t for any p t  : ^ V i  >  p L  >  Ol V1 — r ,  -J**-Vi2 = n 2 > 0. It follows tha t,
Pbu
if the monopolist is to purchase used goods at a price higher than the price 
offered by competitive traders, it would optimally set p ^  =  Ol V1, i.e. it would 
optimally internalise transaction costs. This allows the monopolist to obtain
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profits equal to
II2 =  (n \ 4- 722) [Oh  (V2 — Vi) +  Ol Vi — £2] — n it  (4-4)
By comparing now expression 4.3 and expression 4.4 it is straightforward to 
notice th a t II2 >  II2 , which implies tha t the monopolist is always better off by 
intervening in the secondary market and internalising transaction costs rather 
than by leaving secondary trading to be managed by competitive traders. ■
The intuition for this result is the following. The monopolist can induce 
former patrons to upgrade by either selling the new good at a low price or 
by purchasing their used good at a high price. The profits obtained from for­
mer consumers who upgrade are the same under the two strategies: what the 
monopolist gives with one hand, it takes with the other. However, the two 
strategies are not equivalent in terms of profits from sales to new consumers: 
the monopolist obtains higher profits when charging the highest price possible 
for the new good to consumers in cohort 2. By offering trade-ins and inter­
nalising transaction costs, the manufacturer can maintain a high price for the 
new good while inducing former patrons to upgrade. Intervening directly in 
the secondary market is therefore a way to ease the transaction th a t allows a 
consumer who purchased the old technology to upgrade to the new one and 
to sell the new technology at the highest price possible to consumers who 
purchase the good for the first time.
In the case of an industrial good, the existence of a second-hand market 
is a necessary condition for consumers in cohort 1 to upgrade to  technology 
V2  in equilibrium. This is because, by assumption, the manufacturer of an 
industrial good cannot profitably sell an upgrade to  former patrons who value 
the upgrade less than its cost of production. In the case of a knowledge-based 
good, however, the monopolist can profitably sell the new technology to  Oh
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consumers in both cohorts even if there is no active secondary market. I will 
show tha t, in this case, the monopolist can actually be better off by purchasing 
the used good and scrapping it, thereby practically killing-off the secondary 
market. In this case the monopolist purchases the used good simply as a means 
to discriminate between consumers with a different purchase history: it can 
charge consumers in cohort 1 a low price tha t reflects only their willingness 
to pay to  upgrade, while charging consumers in cohort 2 the full price. This 
is possible because, by killing-off the secondary market, the monopolist does 
not create any substitution opportunity for new consumers in cohort 2.
P ro p o s itio n  4.2 I f  (and only if) it is optimal fo r the manufac­
turer of a knowledge-based good to offer a trade-in promotion and to kill-off 
the secondary market .
P ro o f. If the monopolist kills off the secondary market, all Oh consumers 
in both cohorts purchase the new technology and the monopolist is able to 
discriminate between the two cohorts and to extract all consumer surplus by 
charging price p 2  = OhV2 to consumers who do not have a used good to trade-
in and price p 2  = Oh (V2 — Vi) to  consumers who can trade-in a used good. By
doing so, and assuming th a t the manufacturer would still incur the transaction 
cost r  (which can be interpreted as a disposal cost), it would get profits equal 
to
III =  n \  [Oh  (V2 — V i) — C2 -  t]  +  712 [Oh V 2 ~  02] =
=  (rai 4- 712) [OhV2 ~  02] — Tii (OhV1 +  t )
If the monopolist trades used goods (which I showed th a t is always more 
profitable than allowing secondary trading by competitive traders), it obtains
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profits
n 2 =  (ni +  n 2) [Oh (V2  — Vi) -+- OlVi — c2] — n \r  
The difference IIi — II2 is equal to
III — II2 =  ( ^ 1  +  n 2) {Oh  — Ol ) V\ — tiiOh Vi 
which is positive if and only if > v'x^ t • ■
In the case of a knowledge-based good, the monopolist can sell the new 
technology to consumers in both cohorts by either easing or killing-off sec­
ondary trading. Killing-off the secondary market is akin to paying tiiOhVi 
(by offering a discount to  consumers in cohort 1) in order to capture the full 
surplus of high-type consumers from consuming V2  rather than leaving them 
information rents. It is therefore optimal if consumers’ willingness to pay for 
quality is relatively heterogeneous or if there are not too many former con­
sumers.
4 .4 .2  E q u ilib r iu m  w ith  n o  u p g ra d in g
I have characterised the optimal strategy of the monopolist when it sells the 
new technology to both cohorts of consumers. It is also possible for the mo­
nopolist to sell the new durable good to consumers in cohort 2 only. In this 
case it would obtain a profit equal to n 2 [Oh Vz — c2].
Proposition 4.3 identifies the condition(s) under which it is optimal for the 
monopolist to sell the new technology to both groups of consumers rather than 
to consumers in cohort 2 only. This is a substantial question relevant only for 
the manufacturer of an industrial good since, as long as transaction costs are 
not too large, in the case of a knowledge-based good the monopolist is always 
worse off by not offering a trade-in promotion and selling to  consumers in
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cohort 2 only because it can perfectly price discriminate between consumers 
with different purchase histories by killing-off the secondary market.
P rop osition  4.3 (i) The manufacturer o f an ”industrial” good optimally sells 
the new technology to consumers in both cohorts i f  and only i f  V2  is large 
enough, (ii) Provided that transaction/disposal costs are low enough, the man­
ufacturer o f a "knowledge-based" good would always optimally sell the new 
durable good to both cohorts o f consumers.
P roof. Consider first the case of an industrial good. The profits tha t 
the monopolist obtains when it sells the new technology V2  to both groups of 
consumers and by intervening directly in the secondary market are
II2 =  (n\ +  712) [Oh  (V2 — Vi) -1- Ol Vi — C2] — n \r
The profits th a t the monopolist obtains when selling V2 only to consumers in 
cohort 2 are given by
II2 =  712 [Oh V2 — C2]
It is optimal to sell to both groups of consumers if and only if II2 >  n 2, 
i.e. iff
(711 +  712) [Oh (V2 — Vi) +  OlV1 — 0 2 ] — n \r  > 712 [OhV2  ~  £2]
This is true if and only if
y  >  (Oh  — Ol ) ( f  +  ^ 2 / ^ 1) Vi +  (^2  +  r)
2 “  0H
Consider now the case of a knowledge-based good. By offering a trade-in
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promotion the manufacturer obtains profits equal to
II2 =  ni [Oh {V2  — Vi) -  C2 — r] +  722 [OhV2 — c2]
since it would sell the new durable good to n i consumers in cohort 1 at price 
Oh (V2  — Vi) bearing a cost equal to (02  +  r )  for each unit sold and it would 
sell the new durable good to 722 consumers in cohort 2 at price OhV2 bearing 
a cost of C2 for each unit sold.
However, by selling only to Oh  consumers in cohort 2, the manufacturer 
obtains profits equal to
n 2 =  722 [Oh V2 — £2]
Offering a trade-in promotion is therefore optimal as long as
[Oh (V2  — Vi) -  C2 — t ] >  0
i.e. t  < Oh (V2 — Vi) — C2 . This is simply stating the a Oh-type consumer 
must be willing to pay a price for the upgrade at least equal to  the total 
cost of the upgrade, i.e. thfe marginal cost of the new technology plus the 
transaction/disposal cost r .  ■
The intuition for this result is the following. In the case of an industrial 
good, if the monopolist sells the new technology only to  new consumers, it can 
extract all surplus of Oh consumers in cohort 2 from consuming technology 
V2 - By selling the new technology to former patrons as well, the monopolist 
can capture some surplus tha t 0h~type consumers in cohort 1 derive from the 
upgrade but it must leave information rents to O2  consumers in cohort 2. The 
benefit is increasing in the magnitude of technological progress, while the cost 
is not. Hence, when technological progress is sufficiently fast in the sense that
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V2  is sufficiently large, the manufacturer of an industrial good would prefer to 
sell the new technology to both new and former patrons and have an active 
secondary market.7
This result may explain why trade-in promotions are more common in 
innovative markets than in more static industries. For instance, trade-in 
promotions and reselling are very rare in markets for white goods, which are 
characterised by a rather slow rate of technological progress. By contrast, 
trade-in offers are now widespread in many dynamic IT  industries, from per­
sonal computers to mainframes and routers in which manufacturers normally 
resell the used goods th a t they acquire from consumers who upgrade to new 
technologies.
4.5 Conclusions
Secondary trading plays an im portant role in many markets for durable goods 
since it allows consumers to upgrade, or to  upgrade more often, to new durable 
goods of higher quality. There is evidence tha t in many industries manufac­
turers of durable goods often act as intermediaries in the trade of used goods, 
reselling used goods th a t are generally acquired from consumers who upgrade 
to the new technology.
The model presented in this paper offers an explanation of why this can be 
a profitable strategy. The manufacturer has the incentive to intervene directly 
in the secondary market and to internalise transaction costs in order to ease 
the process tha t allows former patrons to upgrade to the new technology and 
to be able to sell the new technology to both new and former consumer at the
7 Notice that this result is different to the one obtained by Anderson and Ginsburgh 
(1994) who show that the monopolist prefers not to have an active secondary market when 
individuals place a high value on newness.
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highest price possible.
Transaction costs in the second-hand market reduce the price at which the 
new good can be sold to former patrons compared to the price at which the 
new good could be sold to new consumers. If the monopolist sells the new 
durable good to both groups of consumers, it is constrained by the price tha t 
it can charge to former patrons. By internalising transaction costs the manu­
facturer can set a higher price for the new good while allowing former patrons 
to  upgrade by purchasing their used goods at a higher price than  the one of­
fered by external traders. This is more profitable than inducing upgrading by 
lowering the price of the new good because it allows the monopolist to charge 
a higher price for the new durable good sold to  new consumers in the market.
For some durable goods, the existence of a second-hand market is not nec­
essary for former patrons to  upgrade to the new better technology since the 
monopolist can profitably sell an upgrade to former consumers. In this case, 
the manufacturer may optimally buy-back used goods, i.e. it may implicitly 
purchase (and dispose of) used goods from former consumers by offering a 
discount to those consumers who trade in their used good. In this case the 
manufacturer can price discriminate between consumers with different pur­
chase histories by killing-off the secondary market.
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